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Abstract
This paper presents a principal-agent model of IMF conditional lending, in the aftermath
of a “capital-account” liquidity crisis. We show that traditional ex-post conditionality can be
e¤ective in safeguarding the Fund’s resources, allowing for the provision of e¢cient emergency
lending and reducing ine¢cient ex-ante credit rationing if the capital out‡ow which triggers
the crisis is not excessive.
We apply the baseline model to analyse the issues of debtor moral hazard and private
sector involvement (PSI), which have characterised the recent debate on reforming the Inter-
national Financial Architecture. We show that debtor moral hazard is only a concern if the
IMF cannot commit to make the post-crisis participation constraint of the debtor country
binding, and that it can only be resolved via ex-ante conditionality (or pre-quali…cation).
Attempts to reduce debtor moral hazard may however compromise the Fund’s ability to
safeguard its resources ex-post.
We also show that PSI in the solution of balance of payments crisis is a central determinant
of the e¤ectiveness of both crisis prevention and resolution e¤orts on the part of the IMF.
PSI may be an enabling condition for e¢cient crisis resolution, and may therefore be imposed
even by a “PSI-averse” IMF. Moreover, there are conditions under which it is optimal for
the IMF to ex-ante precommit to a tough, and ex-post sub-optimal, PSI policy, in order to
mitigate investor moral hazard.
JEL Classi…cation: F33, F34.
Keywords: IMF; conditionality; balance of payments crisis.
The purposes of the IMF are:
[...] (v) To give con…dence to members by making the general resources of the
Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without
resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Conditionality is the practice by which the International Monetary Fund (IMF, or Fund) makes
its …nancial assistance to member countries contingent on the implementation of speci…c eco-
nomic policies. According to Article I(v) of its Articles of Agreement (quoted above) one of the
purposes of the IMF is to intervene in support of member countries which are in a position of
external disequilibrium (i.e. do not have su¢cient foreign exchange to purchase imports or to
service their external debt). When it does so the IMF typically negotiates a program of ad-
justment with the recipient country as a pre-condition for the initial disbursement of resources,
and it makes the release of its funds contingent on the implementation of these programs. This
practice is known as conditionality.1
This paper models IMF conditionality from a contractual perspective, employing a principal-
agent framework. This is designed to capture both the stylised macroeconomic features of
situations of balance of payment disequilibrium which warrant intervention by the IMF, and
the nature and potential e¤ectiveness of these interventions. In doing so the paper seeks to
bring together the various rationales for conditionality which have been put forward since the
inception of this practice in the 1950s, and to analyse their mutual consistency and interaction.
This analysis is of direct relevance to the current debate on reforming the International Financial
Architecture (IFA), which has been triggered by the large international …nancial crises of the mid-
to late 1990s (i.e. most notably the Mexican and East Asian crises), and which has generated a
renewed interest by researchers and policy-makers on possible reforms of IMF crisis lending and
of its conditionality practices.
The main results presented in this paper are as follows. First, two of the basic functions
w h i c hc a nb ei d e n t i … e dw i t hI M Fc o n d i t i o n a l i t yc o n t r a c t s( t h ep r o t e c t i o no fF u n dr e s o u r c e sa n d
the provision of commitment technology to the recipient country) are mutually compatible, if
the balance of payments disequilibrium (or capital out‡ow) which triggers IMF intervention is
not too large. Second, IMF bail-outs can lead to debtor moral hazard if the IMF’s commitment
power is limited. Conditionality can be used to reduce the incidence of this type moral hazard
only if it is applied before the crisis (following “pre-quali…cation” procedures), and in exchange
for larger post-crisis IMF loans. This may however compromise the ability of the Fund to
safeguard its resources after the crisis, which may in turn lead to an institutional bias on the
part of the IMF in favour of traditional ex-post conditionality. Third, if the crisis is large, ex-
post Private Sector Involvement (PSI) in the form of debt-relief is a pre-condition for e¤ective
conditionality. Depending on the IMF’s attitude towards PSI and on the severity of investor
moral hazard, the IMF may …nd it optimal to pre-commit before a crisis to maximise PSI if a
crisis occurs. This may in turn introduce ine¢cient credit constraints ex-ante.
This paper proceeds as follows: the rest of this introduction consists of a brief review of
existing literature on conditionality, and of the approach taken in this paper; Section 2 presents
the baseline model of IMF conditionality, and Sections 3 to 5 employ and extend the basic
framework to analyse three issues respectively: conditionality as commitment technology, debtor
moral hazard, and PSI; Section 6 concludes.
1Appendix A.1 provides some information on the practice of IMF conditional lending, describing the nature
and historical use of IMF …nancial facilities which are subject to conditionality.
21.1 Existing Work on IMF Conditionality
Much has been written about IMF conditionality. This has been mostly about the content
of conditionality, i.e. the type of policy changes demanded by the IMF as part of its …nancial
assistance programs, and the e¤ectiveness of the IMF’s approach to stabilisation and adjustment
(see e.g. Williamson (1983) and Shadler et al. (1995)). However work on the rationale and
design of conditionality contracts (which is the subject of this paper) has been relatively scarce,
especially at a formal level.
Papers which deal with (or comment on) the contractual aspects of conditionality can be
broadly divided into three categories, which partially re‡ect three distinct stages in the evolution
of the international monetary system, and which therefore place emphasis on di¤erent potential
rationales for IMF intervention: the Bretton Woods era (or conditionality as a safeguard); the
debt crisis of the 1980s (or conditionality as commitment technology); and the capital-account
crises of the mid- to late 1990s (or conditionality as moral-hazard containment).
1.1.1 Conditionality as a Safeguard
The traditional and core view of IMF conditionality, as implicitly stated in the Articles of
Agreement of the Fund and applied during the Bretton Woods era, is that by linking its …nancial
support to policy changes, the IMF safeguards its resources, and guarantees their revolving
nature.2 This is because conditionality can help to ensure that adjustment to a balance of
payment disequilibrium will take place and that the temporary relief o¤ered by the Fund’s
intervention will not lead to delays in the implementation of necessary adjustment policies. This
in turn implies that the recipient country will be in a position to repay the Fund in due course
(see e.g. Guitian (1981); IMF (2000b)). Conditionality therefore can be seen as acting as a
substitute for the collateral which is typically employed in domestic loan contracts to discipline
the behaviour of the borrower.
The ability to safeguard its lending via conditionality is often seen as a unique privilege of
the Fund relative to private suppliers of liquidity,3 which enables it to intervene at times of crisis
and prevent actions which are otherwise optimal for the debtor country, but which may have a
negative externality on other IMF members.4 Conditionality as a safeguard may therefore go
hand in hand with conditional lending as a bribe, which is used by the Fund to induce recipient
countries to adopt policies which have a public good component.5
2The IMF’s resources are made up of its members’ quotas. The Fund therefore functions like a credit coop-
erative, making its resources available to members on a temporary and revolving manner. See Appendix A.1 for
more detail on the IMF’s lending practices.
3This argument has been made by a number of authors (e.g. Sachs (1989b) and Rodrik (1996)), who argue
that the IMF has an advantage relative to private creditors in imposing and enforcing conditionality for several
reasons: political neutrality (which makes the commitment not to extract an excessive share of the bene…ts of
reform credible); informational advantage (e.g. lower costs in monitoring the implementation of conditionality);
higher leverage relative to private creditors due to cross-conditionality practices (by which other donors and
creditors link their …nancial support to the implementation of IMF programs).
4This is what Article I(v) refers to as “measures destructive of national or international prosperity”, and
which, depending on speci…c circumstances, may imply sharp (“competitive”) depreciation of the exchange rate,
signi…cant output falls (e.g. recessions) or default on external debt.
5Masson and Mussa (1995) make an argument along these lines.
31.1.2 Conditionality as Commitment Technology
A second rationale for conditionality emerged in the wake of the debt-crisis of the 1980s,6
following the realisation that high levels of sovereign debt may lead to ine¢cient outcomes due
to debt-overhang.7 This refers to the fact that a sovereign with a high level of external debt
may face sub-optimal incentives to invest and achieve higher future incomes because of the large
proportion of future output gains which need to be transferred to external creditors. This can
in turn reduce debt repayment, leading to a Debt La¤er curve. Two solutions to exit such debt
traps have been identi…ed in the literature: fresh liquidity (or debt rescheduling) and/or debt
relief (see e.g. Diwan and Rodrik (1992)). E¢cient solutions to debt-overhang may however not
take place if debtors cannot precommit to policies which increase future output in exchange for
favourable recontracting of their debt obligations (e.g. commit to invest rather than consume
additional lending). Conditionality can represent the mechanism which allows debtors to commit
to e¢cient policies by tying a favourable restructuring of the external debt to the adoption of
these policies, and therefore allowing for an e¢cient exit from a debt-overhang situation.8 In
the absence of conditionality and debt restructuring an ine¢cient outcome may persist (for high
levels of external debt) and/or ex-ante credit-rationing may take place (Fafchamps (1996)).
1.1.3 Conditionality as Moral Hazard Mitigation
A third and more recent interpretation of conditionality is associated with the recent debate
on the how to reform the International Financial Architecture (IFA)9 a n do nt h ep o t e n t i a l
need for an international Lender of Last Resort in a world with large and volatile international
capital ‡ows, which may leave countries exposed to “runs” and liquidity crises even if their
fundamentals are sound (in a fashion similar to the classic Diamond and Dybvig (1983) banking
model).10 Some commentators have argued that, given the scale of the …nancial ‡ows involved,
IMF bail-outs in these circumstances may lead to a problem of moral hazard, and excessive
ex-ante risk-taking by both creditors and debtors (see for instance the IFIAC (or Meltzer)
6This was precipitated by the default of Mexico in the summer of 1982, and led to the IMF playing a key
role in debt rescheduling and (eventually) relief e¤orts, with conditionality at the center of its interventions (see
Guitian (1995)).
7This concept was articulated by a number of authors, in particular Sachs (1989a) and Krugman (1988).
8Alternatively, conditionality can be seen in this context as a mechanism which guarantees to the debtor that
creditors will not extract an excessive share of their future output by delegating the debt-relief (or rescheduling)
management to an impartial organisation like the IMF (Claessens and Diwan (1990); Fafchamps (1996)); or as a
mechanism which screens high productivity countries from low productivity ones, and allows creditors to target
debt-relief on the former (Marchesi and Thomas (1999)).
More generally in these contexts conditionality can be seen as an “external agency of restraint” (Collier (1997))
which allows policy makers to adopt policies which would otherwise be time-inconsistent.
9Eichengreen (2000) dates the start of this on-going debate to a speech made by Rubin (the then U.S. Secretary
of the Treasury) in February 1998. Much of the recent discussion on IFA (e.g. Eichengreen (1999), Eichengreen
(2000), Jeanne (2000) and Goldstein (2000)) centers around the issue of investor and debtor moral hazard reduc-
tion, emphasising the need for reforms of IMF lending (including its conditionality) and for more Private Sector
Involvement in crisis resolution.
10Much has been written on this issue in the wake of the Mexican crisis of 1995, and of the East Asian crisis
of 1997/1998. Relevant work includes Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Chang and Velasco (1999) (who argue in a
favour of a “country-run” interpretation of the crises), Dooley (2000) and Corsetti et al. (2000) (who favour a
“moral-hazard” interpretation for the crises) and Fischer (1999) and Giannini (1999) (who discuss the issue of
international lending of last resort).
4Report (2000)). Given the risk and potential implications of moral hazard, it has been argued
that conditionality should (and can) be seen as a mechanism to limit debtor moral hazard
and introduce co-insurance, by imposing an additional cost onto countries which face a capital-
account crisis and which are bailed-out by the Fund (Guitian (1995); Fischer (1999)).11 In this
context conditionality could therefore be seen as a substitute for the “penal rates” at which the
domestic Lender of Last Resort should lend according to the standard Bagheotian doctrine.
1.2 Structure and Approach of the Paper
As the survey of the literature presented above shows IMF conditionality is a multifaceted
instrument, which is frequently assigned di¤erent roles by commentators (and, arguably, by the
Fund itself). The purpose of this paper is to provide a stylised model which can encompass
these roles, and shed light on their robustness and mutual compatibility.
The framework we develop to analyse IMF conditionality is based around a simple principal-
agent model with the following building blocks: (i) external disequilibrium is due to capital
in‡ows, which can trigger a “sun-spot” crisis (i.e. partially unrelated to fundamentals) by
suddenly withdrawing from the debtor country;12 (ii) the model follows some of the literature
on sovereign debt, starting from a recognition that debt contracts between sovereigns cannot
be enforced, and that willingness to pay rather than ability to pay determines the amount of
debt-repayment (see e.g. Eaton and Fernandez (1995)); (iii) the model assumes that the IMF
is the only potential supplier of conditional liquidity in the immediate aftermath of a crisis
(see the arguments mentioned in Section 1.1 for why this might be so); (iv) hidden action or
information aspects of conditionality contracts are not modelled, for simplicity;13 and (v) there
is no nominal exchange rate, so that a crisis manifests itself as a sudden reversal of foreign
capital ‡ows (possibly followed by debtor default), rather than as a sharp currency depreciation.
In the next section of the paper we employ these building blocks to construct an agency
model of conditionality, where a principal (the IMF) o¤ers a conditional liquidity contract to an
agent (the debtor) following a crisis event. As in standard principal-agent models, the principal
designs the contract to trade-o¤ the maximisation of reform e¤ort with the minimisation of bail-
out transfers. We show that this contract can avoid the occurrence of a ine¢cient liquidity crunch
and of debt overhang if the capital out‡ow which triggers the crisis is not excessive. The use of
conditionality also allows the IMF to lend under “adequate safeguards” (i.e. recover its bail-out
11According to this line of argument, the cost due to conditionality presumably derives from the con‡ict of
priorities between the IMF and the recipient government, which implies that under conditionality the recipient
adopts policies which it would have not adopted otherwise.
12In other words the balance of payments crisis we consider as the trigger for IMF intervention is not a Krugman-
style current-account crisis (as in Krugman (1979)), which is typically driven by over-expansionary policies and/or
negative external shocks, but a capital-account crisis, of the kind seen in Mexico and East Asia in the 1990s. We
focus on capital-account crises to make our analysis directly relevant to the current debate on IMF reforms, but
the set-up we put forward is adaptable to more traditional current-account crises (i.e. the fundamental constraints
on Fund intervention are the same).
13This is the case also in the “moral hazard” extensions of the model that we present in Sections 4 and 5, where
we follow the recent literature on the International Financial Architecture and use the term “moral hazard” rather
loosely, to refer to a situation where an agent does not spontaneously adopt an e¢cient level of “e¤ort” from
the point of view of a principal (as opposed to the standard hidden-action situation where …rst best e¤ort is not
attainable because of a combination of asymmetric information, noise and agent risk-aversion).
It would be relatively straightforward to introduce hidden action and information considerations in the model we
present below, but doing so would not add particularly signi…cant insights about the nature of IMF conditionality.
5at the end of the crisis period), by tying the provision of the bail-out to the implementation of
income-increasing reforms.
Sections 3 to 5 then proceed to draw out some of the implications of the baseline model.
Section 3 shows how the presence of the IMF and of its provision of conditional liquidity can act
as a source of commitment technology for the debtor both ex-post (once a crisis has occurred)
and ex-ante (when foreign capital ‡ows into the country). Whilst ex-post the IMF has incentives
to extract all of the value of this commitment technology with its conditionality contract (given
its incentives to minimise transfers to the agent and maximise adjustment e¤orts), ex-ante the
debtor may bene…t from the external restraint provided by the Fund, due to the reduction in
ine¢cient credit rationing.
Section 4 and 5 address the currently topical issue of whether apparently e¢cient IMF bail-
outs can induce moral hazard. We show in Section 4 that debtor moral hazard (i.e. excessive
risk-taking on the part of the debtor) can arise only if the Fund’s ability to commit to make
the agent’s participation constraint bind ex-post is limited. If this is the case, the IMF ex-post
contract will be characterised by some slippage in the implementation of reforms,14 which will
in turn induce the debtor to reduce ex-ante crisis prevention e¤orts. To solve debtor moral
hazard the Fund needs to complement its ex-post bail-out with ex-ante conditionality, i.e. the
commitment to higher ex-post bail-outs in exchange for more pre-crisis e¤ort on the part of the
debtor. Section 4 shows that if the incidence of the Fund’s ex-post discretion is limited, ex-ante
conditionality is able to restore …rst-best ex-ante e¤orts.
Section 5 examines the role for so-called Private Sector Involvement (PSI) in balance of
payments crises. It shows that PSI can be an essential component of IMF-led crisis resolution
packages, enabling e¢cient IMF bail-outs to take place. Even a PSI-averse IMF, i.e. one which
seeks to maximise debt repayment, will therefore demand some PSI if the capital out‡ow is
large. A PSI-tolerant IMF (i.e. one which trades-o¤ reform inducement with bail-out and PSI
minimisation) has incentives to increase the degree of PSI, but it would still leave some rents
to investors relative to a no-IMF benchmark (as long as in the absence of Fund intervention
investors cannot co-ordinate on an e¢cient debt-relief o¤er). This insurance e¤ect for investors
can generate an investor moral hazard problem, if the probability of crisis is su¢ciently sensitive
to ex-ante capital in‡ows and if the crisis is su¢ciently disruptive (from a global perspective).
If this is the case, the Fund will face incentives to pre-commit to a tougher, and ex-post sub-
optimal, PSI policy, in order to deter excessive capital in‡ows.
Section 6 concludes by summarising the main results obtained in this paper, and highlighting
the variety of trade-o¤s which can be identi…ed between the di¤erent possible functions and
implications of IMF conditionality.
2 The Baseline Model
2.1 Set-up
Consider the following three-player and two-period model. The players are a group of foreign
investors, a recipient (or debtor) country and the IMF. The two periods are an investment period
(t =1 ) and a potential crisis period (t =2 ).
14This slippage can be interpreted as implying that there is ex-post program “ownership” by the debtor.
6At t =1the investors lend an amount k to the recipient country, which is assumed exogenous
in this baseline model, and which we endogenise in the next section of the paper. We assume that
k is consumed by the debtor country, and there is no reserve accumulation or investment.15 At
t =2a ‘crisis’ may occur, with probability °, which leads to a creditor ‘panic’, inducing investors
to collectively demand k back from the debtor country at the beginning of the period. The
probability of crisis is also assumed to be exogenous in this baseline model, and is endogenised
in the extensions we present in Sections 4 and 5. However, both in the baseline model and in
the endogenous-crisis extensions we assume that probability of the crisis occurring is not directly
related to the investors’ prospects for debt-repayment, and that the crisis takes place for reasons
which are outside the model (e.g. investor panic; contagion; or a sudden interest-rate reversal
working against the debtor country).
The recipient country faces a choice of adjustment e¤ort (et)a tb o t ht =1and t =2 . More
e¤ort leads to more output y(et) (i.e. y0(et) > 0) ,b u ta tac o s tc(et). The standard assumption
of convexity of the cost function is made (i.e. both c0(et) and c00(et) are positive). In this
context e¤ort can be thought of as an e¢cient supply-side measure (e.g. price liberalisation, or
a reduction in tari¤s) which increases domestic output but also implies a political economy cost
for the policy makers in the recipient country.16
If a crisis occurs at the beginning of t =2 , the country can choose whether to repay k (which
is demanded back by the creditor) or default. If it repays, it su¤ers a (1 + ¸)k fall in welfare,
where ¸ (which lies between 0 and 1) measures the deadweight loss associated with sudden
capital out‡ows. This can be interpreted as a loss due to early project liquidation (as in many
banking models), or as a cost brought about by a sudden foreign exchange scarcity or a sharp
fall in absorption.17 We assume that the ¸-loss applies to capital out‡ows which take place at
the beginning of the t =2period (i.e. when investors demand their capital back), but not to
those at the end of the period. If the debtor defaults on k it su¤ers a direct sanction p(y(e2))
which is increasing in its domestic production level.18;19
I ft h ec r i s i sd o e sn o to c c u r ,k is not demanded back by the investor, and the debt is serviced
by the debtor at t =2(and thereafter) at the international interest rate. For simplicity the
international interest rate is …xed at 0, so that debt-servicing does not imply any transfer of
resources from debtor to creditor.20
15This is analytically equivalent, in our set-up, to an assumption that foreign capital is invested by the recipient
country at t =1 , and that its returns are fully wiped out in the event of a crisis (e.g. because of early project
termination).
16Alternatively, y(et) can be thought of as the production of tradeables (rather than overall income) and et
as the relative price of tradeables to non-tradeables. Under this interpretation the function c(et) would capture
the policy-makers’ preference with respect to tradeables and non-tradeables, for a given production possibility
frontier for these two goods. Appendix A.3.1 outlines a model which de…nes e¤ort et along these lines.
17This e¤ect could be modelled explicitly, by introducing a concave utility function, or by allowing for price
stickiness (which does not allow the debtor country to produce more tradeables when hit by a crisis to compensate
for the sudden scarcity of foreign exchange). The set-up presented here can be therefore thought of as the reduced
form of a more complex model, which preserves the essential features of such a model (i.e. a sudden out‡ow
of foreign capital is costly) but is more tractable. Appendix A.3.1 outlines a model with price-stickiness which
provides micro-foundations for the presence of a liquidity cost ¸.
18This follows the standard assumption of “gun-boat technology” in the sovereign risk literature (see e.g. Eaton
and Fernandez (1995)).
19The penalty rate p is inclusive of the deadweight loss ¸. The penalty received by the creditor therefore equals
p
1+¸y(e), given that it is net of the liquidity cost ¸.
20The incentives for the creditor to invest k with an interest rate of 0 are made explicit in the extension with
7The IMF has resources at its disposal, and can intervene to bail-out the debtor country if a
crisis occurs at t =2 .21 IMF intervention consists of a conditional loan b, which is disbursed at
the start of t =2(i.e. when the ¸-loss applies) if three requirements are ful…lled by the recipient
country: it implements a given (Fund-determined) second-period e¤ort level e2;i tr e p a y sk to
the investors at the beginning of the period t =2 ; and it repays b to the IMF at the end of the
period. The latter two conditions imply that the IMF requires that the debtor country does not
default on its external debt as a pre-condition for its lending, and that the Fund needs to lend
under “adequate safeguards”, making sure it is repaid at the end of t =2( w ee x p a n do nb o t h
o ft h e s ep o i n t sb e l o w ) .B yt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o dt =2the deadweight loss ¸ on capital out‡ows
does not apply, so that the cost to the debtor of repaying the amount b equals ¡b. This implies
that an IMF bail-out leads to a net utility transfer of ¸b to the debtor.
The utility functions of the recipient country and of the IMF are as follows:
² Recipient utility (UR
t ,f o rt = f1;2g):
UR




> > > <
> > > :
y(e2) ¡ c(e2) if there is not a crisis
y(e2) ¡ c(e2) ¡ p(y(e2)) if there is a crisis and default
y(e2) ¡ c(e2) ¡ (1 + ¸)k + ¸min(b;k)
| {z }
if the IMF intervenes
if there is a crisis and no default
² IMF utility:
UIMF = y(e2) ¡ b
The IMF’s utility function is underpinned by the assumption that the Fund is concerned
about the production level of the recipient country (which may, for instance, contribute to
global stability and/or international trade), and that it also seeks to minimise the use of its
resources (to maintain their revolving nature).22 Note that we are assuming that the Fund
is not directly concerned with the consumption level in the recipient country, and does not
directly seek to minimise the dead-weight loss induced by a crisis. However, as we show below,
the presence of a crisis allows the IMF to intervene (i.e. a crisis gives leverage to the Fund)
and mitigate the incidence of the deadweight loss ¸k,e v e nt h o u g hn o n eo ft h ee ¢ c i e n c yg a i n s
brought about by the IMF’s actions are passed on to the recipient country. In section 4 we relax
the latter assumption, and allow for some rents from Fund intervention to be appropriated by
the recipient.
endogenous capital which we consider in the next section of the paper, and relate to capital depreciation in the
investor country.
21We do not allow the IMF to intervene before the crisis. This assumption is relaxed in the debtor moral hazard
extension of the model (Section 4).
We also do not model why the IMF has access to …nancial resources. We simply assume the existence of a
quota-funded IMF as an instrument of international monetary co-operation, which acts a source of emergency
reserves (which is an e¢cient risk-pooling activity for member states if the shocks which trigger external crises
are idiosyncratic) and as a promoter of international economic linkages (see the IMF’s utility function in the main
text).
22Note that this assumes that the IMF does not care about …rst period output. This assumption is made for
simplicity and is innocuous, given that we are ruling out IMF intervention before a crisis in the baseline model.
8The following assumptions on functional forms are made in what follows, for the sake of
tractability: y(et)=et; p(et)=pet,w i t hp 2 (0;1);a n dc(et)=1
2e2
t.
Figure 1 summarises the timing of the game. As the …gure shows, we assume that the
realisation of the crisis is known before the actual out‡ow of k or the levying of the penalty
p(e2), which allows the recipient country to set e2 a c c o r d i n gt ow h e t h e ri tw a n t st od e f a u l to n
its debt or not. The …gure also illustrates the fact that the IMF’s bail-out takes place just after
e2 is set, which allows the Fund to enforce a pre-announced conditional liquidity contract (see
Section 2.3 for further discussion of this point).
As it is shown in the rest of this section this set-up can convey the basic rationale for IMF
intervention: by providing valuable balance of payment support and granting debtor countries
“time to adjust” (i.e. allowing them to avoid the ¸-cost associated with a sudden capital out‡ow),
the Fund can induce income-increasing reforms, avoid unnecessary demand-side adjustment (i.e.
an excessive fall in consumption) and, depending on the level of debt, avoid ine¢cient debt-
overhang. The scope for e¢cient intervention by the IMF hinges on the interaction between
conditionality and the size of the capital out‡ow, as the results presented below illustrate.
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Figure 1: The timing of the game.
2.2 The Equilibrium without the IMF





@e1 =1¡ e1 =0 ), which is independent of the level of capital in‡ow k given
the assumption of quasi-linearity in the utility function.23
At t =2if the crisis does not occur the same level is chosen for e2. If a crisis occurs the
debtor faces a choice between defaulting and paying the debt. This yields the following optimal
23Throughout the paper we write variables with a superscript ¤ to denote optimal levels in the absence of IMF





1 for k · kD (repayment equilibrium)






1+¸ ,w i t h@kD
@p > 0 (i.e. the likelihood of default falls with the size of the
default penalty).
Equation (1) implies that if the level of external debt is high enough the recipient …nds it
optimal to default on its external debt and reduce national output (or withdraw from external
trade), and su¤er the penalty p(e). This corresponds to a situation of debt overhang (as in Sachs
(1989a)), where high levels of external debt induce a country to reduce adjustment e¤ort and
therefore production. For low levels of k, the recipient …nds it optimal to repay the debt, and
run a current account surplus equal to (1 +¸)k at the start of t =2 , by reducing consumption.






2 ¡ (1 + ¸)k for k<k D
(1¡p)2
2 for k ¸ kD
2.3 The Equilibrium with the IMF
As set out above, the IMF can intervene if a crisis occurs at t =2 : The IMF’s incentive to supply
emergency funds derives from its ability to o¤set the deadweight loss ¸k with its bail-out and,
therefore, obtain some leverage on the recipient country to induce it to adopt an optimal level
of adjustment.24
IMF intervention consists of conditionality, i.e. the o¤er of a bail-out b in exchange for a given
second period e¤ort level e2. We assume here that the IMF can enforce the optimal contract
fbc;e c
2g in a time-consistent fashion, i.e. it can guarantee that the agent will exercise e¤ort ec
2
in exchange for the (net) transfer ¸bc (as long as the agent’s individual rationality constraint
is satis…ed). In our set-up this is analytically equivalent to assuming that the choice of e2 by
the agent can be observed by the Fund and is not reversible, and that the Fund has access to
full commitment technology (and hence has all the bargaining power). If this is the case, the
principal can enforce optimal conditionality by relying, for instance, on a linear contract which
speci…es b as a function of e2, and which therefore ‘delegates’ the choice of e2 to the agent. By
meeting the relevant incentive compatibility constraint, such a contract would ensure that ec
2 is
set by the agent, and bc is transferred by the principal.
In practice however reform implementation is a gradual and reversible process, and only
a share of the IMF’s bail-outs is paid out at the outset of a reform program, and additional
tranches of b are released depending on the level of progress in reforming policies. That is, the
IMF solves the incentive-provision problem which would be caused by front-loading the bail-
o u ti nt h ea b s e n c eo ft h ea g e n t ’ sc o m m i t m e n tt oag i v e nl e v e lo fe2 by staggering its lending
(see Appendix A.1). This gives rise to a trade-o¤ between the early disbursement of bail-out
funds (which is more e¤ective in preventing excessive demand-side adjustment and, therefore, in
24Note that the adjustment that we are allowing for here is both an explicit supply-side adjustment (i.e. a
change in e, or “expenditure-switching”) and an implicit demand-side one (i.e. a reduction in absorption, or
“expenditure-changing”) which is given by the change in consumption (= income - debt repayment) relative to a
no-crisis outcome.
10meeting the agent’s participation constraint) and the provision of incentives to change policies.
We abstract from this trade-o¤ in our modelling, by e¤ectively ‘compressing’ the timing of
the liquidity-reform contract and assuming that reforms demanded by the IMF can be fully
implemented before liquidity is provided.25
Our modelling of conditionality does however allow for the imperfect enforcement of the
optimal IMF contract due to limited commitment power on the part of the Fund. This is
arguably a more relevant reason, from a policy perspective, for why optimal IMF conditionality
contracts may not be fully enforceable. We introduce this feature in Section 4 of the paper, in
the context of our discussion of debtor moral hazard.
The IMF is subject to three constraints in its intervention. One is a standard individual
rationality constraint (IRC) for the recipient country, which in this case implies that the cost
to the recipient country of implementing the level of e¤ort demanded by the IMF rather than
e¤
2 and the cost of having to repay k fully for all values of k (i.e. even for k ¸ kD)n e e d st ob e
outweighed by the bene…t of receiving the IMF bail-out at the outset of the crisis. We express
this constraint as UR
2 (e2;b;¡k) ¸ U
R;¤
2 where UR
2 (e2;b;¡k) indicates the recipient’s utility when
it exercises second-period e¤ort e2, receives b at the beginning of t =2(and repays it at the end
of the period), and pays back k at the beginning of t =2 .
The second constraint re‡ects the legal framework under which the IMF operates (as re‡ected
in its Articles of Agreement), and in particular the need for the Fund to lend “under adequate
safeguards”. This means that the IMF needs to guarantee that the recipient country faces
appropriate incentives to repay at the end of period 2 the funds lent as part of the bail-out. This
constraint is satis…ed if we impose the following restriction on IMF contracts fe2;bg:
p
1+¸e2 ¸ b.
This assumes that the Fund has access to the same penalty technology as private creditors, and
accounts for the fact that the penalty faced by the recipient for not paying the Fund needs to
be scaled down by 1+¸, given that it is levied at the end of period 2. We de…ne this restriction
as the “Adequate Safeguards Constraint” (ASC).
The third constraint is a “no net transfers constraint”, which implies that the size of the
bail-out cannot exceed the initial capital out‡ow su¤ered by the debtor country (i.e. b · k).
This is a technical constraint which is employed to re‡ect the fact that any b in excess of k
does not bene…t the recipient (given that it does not provide any liquidity relief), and therefore
cannot be optimal for the IMF (since it cannot be used to induce additional e¤ort).
Optimal IMF intervention therefore consists of a conditional bail-out package {e2;bg which
solves the following program:
max
e2;b
UIMF = e2 ¡ b
s:t: : UR
2 (e2;b;¡k) ¸ U
R;¤




e2 (adequate safeguards constraint) (ASC)
: b · k (no net transfers constraint)
Figure 2 describes the IMF ’s conditionality program, plotting the Fund’s indi¤erence curve
in (b;e2) space and the three constraints under which it optimises (i.e. the IRC, the ASC and
25Our modelling approach is also analytically equivalent to assuming that b
c is released in tranches (e.g. ac-
cording to an optimal linear contract) as e2 is increased up to e
c
2, over a time horizon during which the additional
‘liquidity’ value of the bail-out (i.e. ¸b) applies in full.
11the b = k schedule). The …gure illustrates the fact that making IRC binding is always optimal
for the Fund (i.e. …rst-best conditional e¤ort is at the tangency of the IMF’s indi¤erence curve
and the IRC) and that a binding b · k constraint and/or a binding ASC lower the intensity of
conditionality relative to the …rst-best and can ultimately provoke the collapse of the contract.
This is shown formally in Proposition 1, which describes the properties of the solution to the
IMF’s conditionality program, and is also illustrated in Figure 3 below.
Proposition 1 The intensity of IMF conditionality is a function of the level of capital out‡ows
which precipitate the balance of payments crisis.
For high values of k (i.e. k>k H ´ (1+¸)kD) no conditionality can be imposed by the IMF
(i.e. the IR and “no net transfers” constraints cannot be jointly satis…ed).
For lower values of k (i.e. k · kH); three cases for the optimal conditionality contract can be
identi…ed, depending on whether the “no net transfers” constraint and the “adequate safeguards”
constraint bind:
(i) neither the “no net transfer” nor the “adequate safeguards” constraints bind if kD ¸ ¸
2
and for k 2
£¸
2;kM¤
,w h e r ekM ´ kH ¡ ¸2
2 : I ft h i si st h ec a s et h eI M Fi sa b l et oi n d u c e… r s t - b e s t
conditionality, characterised by:
ec









¸ (k ¡ kD) for k 2 [kD;kM]
For other values of k or if kD < ¸
2 (which implies kD >k M), the IMF can only impose
second-best conditionality (i.e. ec
2 < 1+¸). If this is the case we have:
(ii) For p high enough (i.e. p ¸ ¹ p ´ 2¸
1+¸) the “adequate safeguards” constraint is always










2(kH ¡ k) for k 2 [max(kD;kM);kH]
(iii) For p<¹ p the “adequate safeguards” constraint binds if k ¸ max(kD;kM) for high
enough k. This implies that there exists a ^ kH(p) 2 (max(kD;kM);kH) such that for k>^ kH(p)
conditionality collapses. For k 2 (max(kD;kM);^ kH(p)] we have one of two cases, depending on
the value of p:i fp 2 [^ p; ¹ p) (where ^ p ´
2¸(1+¸)
1+2¸(1+¸) < ¹ p); we have that ec
2 and bc are given by the
values in case (ii) above, in the relevant range for k;i fp<^ p,b o t hec
2 and bc are lower than the
corresponding levels in case (ii) at k = ^ kH(p), and converge to those levels for lower values of k:
Proof. In Appendix A.2.1.
Proposition 1 shows the IMF is able to “bribe” the country experiencing a balance of pay-
ments crisis to exert more adjustment e¤ort and, where relevant, not default on its foreign debt,
as long as the level of external debt is not too high. The “bribe” consists of the provision of
foreign exchange to the debtor country at a time of crisis. The ability to provide such a bribe
partially derives to the IMF from the fact that it can impose conditionality to safeguard its
bail-out, and prevent default on its own lending. We elaborate on this point in the next section
of the paper, where we discuss the role of the contract as ex-post commitment technology for




























IMF utility increases as one moves South-East (i.e. towards a higher effort level and a lower bail-out), and its
indifference curve has a slope of 1. 
 
The IRC is a convex function of e2, given that the cost of e2 is quadratic, and always binds at the optimum, since the
IMF has incentives to minimise b. The unconstrained optimum (first-best effort) is therefore at the tangency of the
IMF’s indifference curve and the IRC. 
 
Higher levels of b are necessary to satisfy the IRC if k > k
D, given that if this is the case the recipient finds it optimal to
default on the external debt in the absence of IMF intervention, and needs to be compensated for not doing so. This is
why, in this case, the IRC lies above the x-axis and its position is a function of k. 
 
The additional two constraints faced by the IMF are also shown on this graph: the ASC, which is flatter (and therefore
harder to satisfy) the lower is the penalty for default p; and the b # k constraint. Both of these constraints are shown as
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Panels III and IV depict case (iii) of the Proposition, which describes the optimal IMF contract for high 
values of k (k > max(kD,kM)) and relatively low values of p (p < p).
Panel III shows the weakening of conditionality relative to case (ii) if the penalty rate p is particularly low 
(namely p<p). If this is the case the IMF needs to weaken conditionality further relative to the case (ii), and 
conditionality collapses ‘earlier’ (i.e. for lower threshold values of k).
Panel IV shows the corresponding case for p (( p,p). If this is the case, as long as conditionality can be 
imposed, the effort level is equal to case (ii). However conditionality collapses ‘earlier’ than under case (ii), 
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Panels III and IV depict case (iii) of the Proposition, which describes the optimal IMF contract for high 
values of k (k > max(kD,kM)) and relatively low values of p (p < p).
Panel III shows the weakening of conditionality relative to case (ii) if the penalty rate p is particularly low 
(namely p<p). If this is the case the IMF needs to weaken conditionality further relative to the case (ii), and 
conditionality collapses ‘earlier’ (i.e. for lower threshold values of k).
Panel IV shows the corresponding case for p (( p,p). If this is the case, as long as conditionality can be 
imposed, the effort level is equal to case (ii). However conditionality collapses ‘earlier’ than under case (ii), 




































Panels I and II illustrate case (ii) of the Proposition, where the b = k constraint is always binding. 
Panel I shows the case of excessively low k, which decreases the leverage of the Fund, and forces it to accept 
an effort level which is below the first-best one. 
Panel II illustrates the case of high k (but not high enough to lead to a collapse of conditionality) and high p, 
where the Fund needs to settle for second-best effort given its inability to compensate the recipient for both 































Panels I and II illustrate case (ii) of the Proposition, where the b = k constraint is always binding. 
Panel I shows the case of excessively low k, which decreases the leverage of the Fund, and forces it to accept 
an effort level which is below the first-best one. 
Panel II illustrates the case of high k (but not high enough to lead to a collapse of conditionality) and high p, 
where the Fund needs to settle for second-best effort given its inability to compensate the recipient for both 
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Figure 3: Second-best IMF conditionality (cases (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1).
14Conditionality is at its …rst best (i.e. ec =1+¸; bc <k ) if the crisis is of an intermediate size
a n di ft h ep e n a l t yp is su¢ciently high relative to ¸ so that kD ¸ ¸
2 is satis…ed (see Figure 4 and
Figure 5). The …rst-best e¤ort level re‡ects the one-to-one trade-o¤ faced by the IMF between
extra e¤ort by the recipient and additional bail-out funds, which induces it to optimally increase
e2 relative to the recipient’s optimum (e¤
2 =1 ) in accordance with the marginal e¤ectiveness of
its bail-out in increasing the recipient’s utility (which is given by ¸). The …rst-best conditionality
contract can be decentralised with a linear “tranching” contract of the form b = ¹0+¹1e2, where
the IMF optimally sets ¹c
1 =1and it uses the level of ¹c
0 to satisfy the IRC.
I ft h ec r i s i si se i t h e rt o os m a l lo rt o ol a r g e ,o ri ft h ekD < ¸
2 is not satis…ed, second-best
conditionality needs to be accepted by the Fund. The second-best cases (i.e. cases (ii) and (iii)
of Proposition 1) are illustrated in Figure 3 and in Figure 4. Under second-best conditionality
the intensity of the “tranching” contract is lower than under the …rst-best (¹c
1 < 1).
Conditionality is weakened relative to the …rst-best if capital out‡ow is too small (e.g. k<¸
2)
because if this is the case the bene…ts deriving to the recipient from the IMF bail-out are
relatively low, thereby reducing the leverage of the Fund in imposing extra reform e¤ort. In this
case, bc = k, so that the Fund is e¤ectively “…nancing the run” with its resources.
Conditionality is also not at its …rst best if the crisis is “too large” (e.g. k>k M) since if this
is the case the IMF needs to reduce the intensity of the contract to compensate the recipient
for not defaulting on a higher level of debt. For particularly high levels of capital out‡ows (i.e.
k>k H) the IMF cannot impose any conditionality, and therefore does not intervene. Allowing
for some debt relief mitigates this conclusion, and always enables conditionality to take place,
a si ti ss h o w ni nS e c t i o n5 .
In the high-k second-best cases, the levels of the parameters ¸ and p interact to determine the
intensity of conditionality and the extent to which the IMF is “…nancing the run”. In particular,
if the default penalty is relatively low, the ASC will bind for high k and conditionality will
collapse for values of k below kH (see Figure 5):
As Figure 5 shows, the Fund prefers high values of p relative to ¸ (as in Area I of the graph),
to be able to exercise …rst-best conditionality and not be constrained by the ASC. This is because
high levels of ¸ increase the debt-repayment costs due to the IMF conditionality package for
the debtor, which makes it harder for the Fund to meet the agent’s participation constraint in
the cases where the optimal bail-out is not fully covering the initial capital out‡ow (i.e. where
bc <k ). High levels of p on the other hand make it easier for the IMF to meet the agent’s
participation constraint, and to protect its lending at the end of t =2 .
Throughout the rest of the paper, and in particular in Sections 3 and 5, we restrict the values
of the parameters p and ¸ to be in Area I of Figure 5 (i.e. so that both p ¸ ¹ p and kD ¸ ¸
2 are
satis…ed). This allows us to focus on one speci…c form of ex-post IMF conditionality, enhancing
the tractability of the extensions of the baseline model we consider in the following sections of
the paper. This restriction does not alter the substance of the results obtained in what follows.
The following three sections of the paper employ the baseline model to assess the role of
the IMF in both crisis resolution and prevention, and evaluate the various functions performed
by IMF conditionality. In the next section of the paper we spell out the role of the baseline
conditional liquidity contract as a source of valuable commitment technology for the debtor
country. In Sections 4 and 5 we extend the baseline model to be able to examine the issue of
moral hazard, and to allow for the possibility of PSI (in the form of debt relief) in the crisis
resolution package designed by the IMF.
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Figure 5: The nature of IMF conditionality as a function of the parameters p and ¸.
163 IMF Conditionality as Commitment Technology
In this section of the paper we focus on the role of the IMF as an external agency of restraint
which is capable of constraining the policies of the debtor country and remove sub-optimal
discretionary equilibria. We highlight two roles of IMF conditionality as commitment technology:
an ex-post one, which a¤ects the e¢ciency of crisis resolution; and an ex-ante role, which has an
impact on capital in‡ows before a crisis takes place. Both of these roles are direct by-products
of the baseline IMF conditionality presented in the previous section, and their presence does not
rely on the Fund explicitly seeking to act as an agency of restraint.
We …rstly introduce the idea of IMF conditionality as a source of ex-post commitment tech-
nology. This role of IMF conditionality is implicit in the modelling we have presented so far,
and the main purpose of the next sub-section is to isolate and clarify some of the features of
the baseline IMF contract, and to illustrate their relationship with the issue of debtor ex-post
commitment.
The second commitment role of conditionality highlighted in this section requires us to
extend the modelling presented so far, by endogenising capital in‡ows at t =1 . This enables us
to examine issues of credit-rationing, and to introduce a framework which we also use in Section
5 of the paper, to analyse the issue of PSI (in the form of debt-relief) and investor moral hazard.
Both of the roles of IMF conditionality we discuss in this section have been noted, and
to some extent formalised, in the literature on sovereign debt and conditionality.26 The main
objective of this section of the paper is therefore to incorporate these results in the context of
the stylised agency framework introduced here, and to show that our baseline model is capable
of capturing them. In the following two applications of the baseline model (in Sections 4 and 5)
we extend the model in original directions, addressing issues which are currently being discussed
i nt h ec o n t e x to ft h ed e b a t eo nr e f o r m i n gt h eI F A .
3.1 Ex-post Commitment, Ownership and Safeguards
The model of conditionality presented in the previous section interprets IMF conditional bail-
outs as contracts for liquidity, in the context of a balance of payments crisis. In our baseline
model the IMF is assumed to have a comparative advantage relative to private investors with
respect to both the imposition of conditionality (i.e. the ability to monitor and contract upon
e2) and in the provision of emergency liquidity (i.e. in the form of the bail-out b). In this sub-
section we show that the …rst property of the contract (i.e. conditionality) can be interpreted as
a source of post-crisis commitment technology which can bene…t the debtor relative to a no-IMF
state of the world, as long as the Fund refrains from extracting all the rents from its intervention.
It is possible to isolate the role of conditionality by initially considering an IMF bail-out
without conditionality, i.e. the provision of unconditional liquidity following a crisis. A default-
averse IMF which is subject to an “adequate safeguards” constraint is able to avoid default and
debt-overhang by providing an unconditional bail-out b w h i c hi sl e s so re q u a lt ok,a sl o n ga s








2 (kD;kH). ^ kD is the value of external debt which
26Sachs (1989b) notes the importance of IMF conditionality as a source of commitment in debt restructuring
negotiations, and Claessens and Diwan (1990), Diwan and Rodrik (1992) and Fafchamps (1996) formalise this
insight. Fafchamps (1996) also comments on the potential role of IMF conditionality in mitigating ine¢cient
credit rationing ex-ante.
17makes the debtor indi¤erent between repayment and default at the end of t =2(i.e. when
the liquidity cost of sudden capital out‡ows ¸ does not apply). It therefore corresponds to the
maximum amount that the IMF can lend unconditionally at the start of t =2 ,a n ds t i l lb e
certain to be repaid at the end of t =2 .
As long as b · k · ^ kD, the IMF is able to intervene under adequate safeguards, without the
need to impose conditionality. The fact that ^ kD >k D implies that, by acting as a pure liquidity
provider, the IMF can increase the range of values of debt k for which ine¢cient default does
not occur in equilibrium.27 This increases debt repayment and makes the debtor country better
o¤, relative to the no-IMF outcome (see Figure 6, which plots debtor utility in the no-IMF case
and in the full debt-rescheduling, i.e. b = k,c a s e ) .
The liquidity-only intervention also increases IMF utility (i.e. UIMF = e2 ¡ b) relative to
a no bail-out alternative, given that debtor reform e¤ort equals 1, rather than 1 ¡ p,a n dt h e
funds provided by the IMF are always below p (given that ^ kD <p ). The IMF faces therefore
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Figure 6: Debtor’s utility as a function of external debt k and of the IMF’s bail-out policy.
Liquidity without conditionality therefore can improve the e¢ciency of the interaction be-
tween private investors, the debtor and the IMF (i.e. all three parties are better o¤).28 The
27This e¤ect is due to the fact that the marginal bene…t to the debtor of a reduction in the liquidity ‘tax’ ¸
is larger if the country is repaying its debt as opposed to defaulting, given that in the latter case the country
reduces its exposure to the tax by distorting its production. Therefore, if the e¤ective ¸¡penalty faced by the
debtor is reduced (which is the case for b>0) a higher value of the debt k is required to equalise debtor utility
in the debt-repayment and default equilibrium respectively.
28If investors are su¢ciently patient within the t =2period, they may be willing to provide the unconditional
liquidity themselves, rendering IMF intervention unnecessary for k<^ k
D. Our assumption of “investor panic” once
a crisis hits is e¤ectively equivalent to a high-impatience assumpion, which rules out this form of PSI, and forces
the IMF to act as a sole provider of both emergency lending and conditionality. Allowing for private contributions
18absence of conditionality does not however allow the Fund to maximise the e¢ciency of crisis
resolution and it does not provide it with enough ‡exibility to maximise its own utility.
The …rst e¤ect is clear from the fact that ^ kD <k H: there is a range of debt (namely
k 2 (^ kD;kH] for which liquidity plus conditionality can avoid default and sub-optimal e¤ort,
whilst unconditional liquidity cannot. In this range of k the debtor would like to be able to
pre-commit, after a crisis has occurred, to repaying the entirety of the debt and set e2 =1 ,i n
exchange for a bail-out equal to k (which is equivalent to a debt stand-still until the end of t =2 ).
However, if conditionality is not imposed (e.g. because e2 cannot be observed by the Fund), the
debtor has incentives to renege on the promise of full debt repayment at the end of t =2 ,a n d
minimise the cost of default by setting e2 =1¡
p









as shown in Figure 6). Anticipating this, the Fund would not release the unconditional b = k
bail-out, if k 2 (^ kD;kH].
By making the bail-out conditional on reform e¤ort, the IMF can solve this ex-post debtor
commitment problem, and allow for e¢cient debt-rescheduling to take place. By doing so the
Fund is also able to lend under adequate safeguards, and prevent debtor default on the bail-out.
This implies that in this range of k (k 2 (^ kD;kH]), the conditional bail-out contract displays
a circular logic: the provision of emergency liquidity allows the Fund to impose conditionality
(i.e. additional reform e¤ort), which in turn protects IMF resources and enables the bail-out to
take place.
From the debtor’s perspective, the most attractive conditional liquidity package which solves
its commitment problem is one which sets bc = k and ec
2 =1 , i.e. it reschedules all of the debt
repayment, and it allows for optimal domestic production (from the debtor’s point of view). As
long as k<k H, the debtor would be better o¤ than under the no-IMF outcome (see Figure 6),
and it would therefore bene…t from the commitment technology provided by IMF conditionality
(i.e. there is “ownership” of the program).29 T h eI M Fw o u l da l s ob eb e t t e ro ¤r e l a t i v et ot h e
no-conditionality outcome: it would earn 1¡b, which is greater than its utility in the no bail-out
case (i.e. UIMF =1¡ p), given that the maximum value for the bail-out, kH,i sl o w e rt h a np.
There is however a second role of conditionality, in the form of debtor rent-extraction, which
is present in the baseline contract described by Proposition 1. If the IMF is not concerned
about leaving any rents to the debtor country in a crisis-situation, then it will use the ability
to contract upon e2 both to maximise the range of k for which default can be avoided under
adequate safeguards (i.e. provide commitment technology to the debtor), and to extract rents
from its intervention (i.e. by increasing e2 and -when possible- decreasing b,r e l a t i v et ot h e
“ownership” package described above).30 If this is the case, the debtor is e¤ectively indi¤erent
between IMF intervention or default, and “ownership” of the program is therefore limited.31
to the provision of bail-out funds (which, for example, might be necessary if the IMF is resource-constrained) may
give rise to issues of IMF moral hazard. That is, the IMF might not face su¢ciently strong incentives to monitor
and enforce its conditionality adequately if it is not the sole (or main) provider of the bail-out (see Rodrik (1996)
for an argument along these lines).
29We explore the debtor moral hazard implications of a “generous” IMF, which leaves rents to the debtor
country, in the next section of the paper.
30As Proposition 1 shows, the IMF …nds it optimal to depart from a policy of full debt rescheduling (b
c = k)
for k 2 (k
D;k
M),a sl o n ga st h ek
D >
¸
2 condition holds. Note that ^ k
D >k
M so that in the range of k where
conditioning on e2 is required to enable the Fund to lend under adequate safeguards, the IMF captures the rents
from its intervention by increasing e2 above 1 (rather than by reducing b below k).
31On the other hand, the investors’ participation constraint is slack in the baseline conditionality model, im-
19The ability to condition on e2 therefore allows the Fund both to provide valuable commitment
to debtor and to extract the value of this commitment via demanding higher reform e¤orts.
For k>k H conditionality collapses, given that the IMF cannot provide enough incentives
to the recipient not to default on its external debt. If this is the case, there is a need for debt
relief to avoid default and enhance the e¢ciency of crisis resolution (we elaborate on this point
in Section 5). Three ranges for the values of external debt can be therefore identi…ed in terms
of required components of a debt-overhang resolution package: for k 2 (kD;^ kD) unconditional
liquidity is required; for k 2 [^ kD;kH] conditional liquidity is necessary; and for k>k H both
conditional liquidity and relief are required.32 These ranges are illustrated in Figure 6:
3.2 Ex-Ante Commitment Technology
3.2.1 The Equilibrium with Endogenous Capital without the IMF
A way to model the ex-ante (i.e. pre-crisis) e¤ects of IMF conditionality is to endogenise period 1
investment k. This allows for an analysis of the e¢ciency properties of the investment equilibria
with and without IMF intervention, focusing on the issue of credit-rationing.
To endogenise period 1 capital in‡ows k we specify a function which describes the return to
investors of holding their capital at home, rather than investing it abroad (i.e. in the debtor
country). We assume that the total capital stock in the investor country equals S,t h a tk
indicates the amount of capital invested abroad, and that aggregate domestic returns are given
by a quadratic function of the following form:
f(S ¡ k)=( 1+S ¡ ®)(S ¡ k) ¡
(S ¡ k)2
2
This domestic return function displays diminishing marginal returns, which induce investors
to transfer some of their capital abroad. ® is a parameter which measures the relative attrac-
tiveness of holding capital abroad, and which we restrict to lie between 0 and S.33
The returns from holding capital abroad are given by the rate of interest (which we assume
to be …xed at 0) and by the probability of a crisis, followed by a default. If no crisis occurs, or
if default is not the post-crisis equilibrium (which is the case for k · kD in the absence of IMF
intervention), the marginal product of capital held abroad equals 1, and optimal investment
behaviour is given by k¤ = ® (i.e. the investor keeps capital at home until f0 equals 1,a n d
invests the rest abroad).34
If a crisis can occur (i.e. the probability of crisis ° is positive) and default is the post-crisis
outcome (k>k D) the marginal product of k is given by 1 ¡ °, and therefore the optimal
investment level is given by k¤ = ® ¡ ° (which equalises marginal returns from holding capital
abroad or at home).
plying that they bene…t from IMF bail-outs. As we show in Section 5, the IMF has incentives to make both the
debtor’s and the investors’ IRCs bind only if investor moral hazard is signi…cant.
32This e¤ect is also highlighted by Claessens and Diwan (1990) and Diwan and Rodrik (1992).
33In what follows we assume that S is high enough (namely S>k
D +
1
1+¸), to ensure that all the cases we
characterise in this section can occur in equilibrium.
34f
0(S ¡ k)=1yields 1+S ¡ k
¤ =1+S ¡ ®, which implies k
¤ = ®.





® for ®<k D
kD for ® 2 [kD;°+ kD]
® ¡ ° for ®>°+ kD
(2)
so that, in equilibrium, defaults occurs only for ®>°+ kD.
This equilibrium, which is sub-game perfect, displays credit rationing (as in Fafchamps
(1996)) in the sense that the level of investment is below the no-default level ® for ® ¸ kD.
This reduction in credit is due to the presence of sovereign risk, which does not allow the debt
contract to be fully enforceable and creates the possibility of strategic default by the debtor.
Proposition 2 below describes the e¢ciency properties of the credit-rationing equilibrium.
Proposition 2 In the absence of IMF intervention credit rationing occurs in the sub-game









For ® ¸ kD + 1
1+¸ credit rationing is an equilibrium outcome but it is not ex-ante ine¢cient.
Proof. For the equilibrium with credit rationing to be ex-ante ine¢cient we require the
expected two-period utility of the debtor to be lower than in a counter-factual situation where
it can precommit to always repay the creditor in a situation of crisis, and therefore receives the
unconstrained amount k¤ = ®:
Comparing expected utilities we obtain the following condition for ine¢ciency:
® ¡ k¤
® ¡ kD >° (1 + ¸) (3)
where k¤ is given by equation (2). For ® 2 (kD;kD + °) we have that k¤ = kD so that an
ine¢ciency results if and only if °< 1
(1+¸).F o r ®>k D + °,w eh a v et h a tk¤ = ® ¡ °,w h i c h
implies that expression (3) holds if and only if ®<k D + 1
1+¸, which also requires the condition
°< 1
1+¸ to hold.
Proposition 2 shows that the sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the creditor-debtor game
is ine¢cient if two conditions (one on the probability of a crisis taking place and one on the
relative productivity of international capital investment) hold. If these conditions are satis…ed,
the debtor’s expected utility would be higher if it were able to credibly precommit not to default
on its external debt if a crisis occurs.35 This is because the loss from the lower level of foreign
capital in‡ows due to credit-rationing outweighs the bene…t of being able to default on this debt
if a crisis takes place.
It is convenient to interpret the bene…t of discretion to the debtor (i.e. the bene…ts which
arise from the ability to default) as the expected value of a put option. Under this interpretation,
the two conditions identi…ed by Proposition 2 determine when the value of the put is lower than
35In the absence of commitment technology (e.g. such as IMF conditionality) this is not possible, given that
default is ex-post optimal for high enough levels of capital (k>k
D).
21the bene…t from commitment (i.e. the additional in‡ow of capital in period 1), implying that
the SPE of the investors-debtor game is ine¢cient. This is the case if the probability of crisis
° (i.e. the probability of being able to exercise the option) is relatively low;36 and if ®; the
pro…tability for investors of lending to the debtor country, is su¢ciently high so as to generate
costly credit rationing (i.e. ®>k D), but also not high enough as to increase the expected
value of the option beyond the value of commitment (i.e. ®<k D + 1
1+¸). This second e¤ect
arises because as ® increases so do capital in‡ows at t =1 , which in turn increases the value of
the option of being able to default on debt if a crisis occurs. That is, the debtor payo¤ in the
debt-repayment equilibrium, which decreases with k¤, can be interpreted as the “stock price”
which determines the value of the put. Higher capital in‡ows therefore lower the “stock price”
and raise the value of the option.37
Figure 7 illustrates the nature of the equilibrium with endogenous capital without the IMF,
and the range of ® for which this is ine¢cient.
k
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Figure 7: The investment equilibrium without the IMF (for °< 1
1+¸).
3.2.2 The Equilibrium with Endogenous Capital with the IMF
As shown in Section 2 the presence of the IMF avoids default for all levels of capital below
kH ´ (1 + ¸)kD, as long as p>¹ p. This has the direct e¤ect of reducing credit rationing by
36The condition for ° is equivalent to the condition for the optimality of imposing capital controls: if °(1+¸) > 1,
the debtor country would like to minimise the in‡ows of capital at t =1 , and therefore any credit rationing is
e¢cient, from its perspective.
37This e¤ect can also be seen by reference to Figure 6, which displays the (…xed) bene…t of defaulting once a
crisis has occurred (i.e. the strike price of the put) and the utility obtained under the debt-repayment outcome
(i.e. the underlying stock price). This shows that the value of the default put and the stock price are inversely
related.





® for ®<k H
kH for ® 2 [kH;°+ kH]
® ¡ ° for ®>°+ kH
The enhanced level of capital ‡ows in turn reduces the range of values for which a Pareto
ine¢cient outcome realises (potentially eliminating it), as shown in Figure 8, and described by
the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 In a situation where the debtor-creditor relationship is characterised by Pareto inef-
…ciency (see Proposition 2), IMF conditionality has the following impact:












1+¸ , IMF conditionality reduces the range of ® for which the ex-ante equilib-
rium is ine¢cient to ® 2
³
(1 + ´)kH;kD + 1
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´
,w h e r e´ ´
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1¡°(1+¸) > 0.





IMF intervention enhances capital ‡ows, a¤ecting the e¢ciency comparison between commit-
ment and discretion relative to the no IMF case. For this range of ® the expected utility com-
parison between commitment and discretion (equation (3)) now yields the following inequality





1 ¡ °(1 + ¸)
¶
kH ´ (1 + ´)kH
where ´ ´
°¸
1¡°(1+¸) > 0 (given that °< 1
1+¸, from Proposition 2). This condition is






For ®>k H+°, the e¢ciency comparison is the same in the IMF and no IMF cases. Ine¢cient
credit rationing therefore characterises the IMF case if ®<k D + 1
1+¸. This is consistent with




1+¸ . Therefore if the latter condition holds IMF intervention
cannot prevent ine¢cient credit-rationing for ® 2 ((1 + ´)kH;kD + 1
1+¸).
The IMF, by intervening with a conditional bail-out and maximising its objective function
can therefore provide commitment technology to the recipient, reducing the incidence of ex-
ante ine¢cient credit-rationing by providing the debtor with a credible “promise” to repay its
external debt. Some ine¢ciency may however remain since credit rationing persists also with
the presence of the IMF, implying that the value of the commitment never to default (which the
IMF cannot supply) may still exceed the expected value of the “discretion put”.
As Lemma 1 shows the IMF eliminates the ine¢ciency if ° is not excessively low or if ®
does not lie within a given intermediate range (which is narrower than the corresponding range
in the no-IMF scenario). If ° is particularly low, the expected value of the ability to default is
relatively small, implying that there is a range of ® for which the value of commitment exceeds
the expected value of the default put option, also in the presence of the IMF. As in the no-IMF
23case, this occurs if ® is su¢ciently high so as to generate costly credit rationing, but not high
enough so as to increase the expected value of put beyond the value of commitment.38
The e¢ciency properties of the IMF-equilibrium are summarised in Figure 8.
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This sub-section has shown the IMF conditionality can enhance the e¢ciency of debtor-
investor interaction, by limiting the negative impact of sovereign risk on capital in‡ows and
mitigating the consequences of the debtor’s lack of commitment power. In contrast to the case
of the provision of ex-post restraint by the Fund analysed in Section 3.1, the IMF does not
extract all the bene…ts from its provision of ex-ante commitment technology to the debtor. In
this sense, program “ownership” is restored from the debtor’s point of view, even though the
debtor’s ex-post participation constraint binds.
As our modelling has highlighted, the Fund is able to act as an e¤ective agency of restraint
by guaranteeing higher debt-repayment to foreign investors, thus reducing the impact of ex-ante
credit-rationing. The bene…ts of higher capital in‡ows brought about by the presence of the
IMF may however have costs associated with them. If investor moral hazard (i.e. the risk of
excessive lending) is a concern, given its impact on the probability of a crisis occurring, the Fund
may wish to reduce its role as a guarantor of foreign investment when a crisis hits and mitigate
capital in‡ows via a relatively “tough” position on PSI in a situation of crisis. We take up this
issue in Section 5 of the paper.
38Note that at the value of ® where credit rationing sets in (i.e. ® = k
H) the expected bene…ts of discretion
exceed those of commitment, given that the latter are small (i.e. credit rationing is limited) whilst the former
re‡ect the value of being able to default on relatively high amounts of debt (k ¸ k
H), and are therefore relatively
large. Commitment is therefore valuable only if debt is strictly higher than k
H (namely, k>(1 + ´)k
H).
244D e b t o r M o r a l H a z a r d
The issue of “moral hazard” is frequently discussed in the context of the IMF and of its crisis
interventions. Some commentators argue that the IMF, by providing insurance to both debtors
and investors in a crisis situation, can induce moral hazard, i.e. insu¢cient crisis-prevention
e¤orts on the part of the debtor (“debtor moral hazard”) and excessive ex-ante investment
on the part of the creditors (“investor moral hazard”) (see, e.g. Goldstein (2000) and IFIAC
(2000)). In this section we extend the baseline model introduced in Section 2 in order to address
the issue of debtor moral hazard, and we devote the next section of the paper to the analysis of
PSI and investor moral hazard.
4.1 Extended Set-up
In the standard insurance principal-agent model moral hazard refers to a situation where a risk-
averse agent who purchases insurance from a principal against some negative realisation and
who can exercise some costly and unobservable e¤ort to reduce the probability of the “bad”
event taking place, does not spontaneously apply the …rst-best level of e¤ort. The solution to
the moral hazard problem (in the context of insurance) is to make the agent’s payo¤ depend on
the realisation of the negative event, to elicit at least second-best e¤ort (i.e. co-insurance takes
place in equilibrium).
The baseline model of crisis and conditionality used in this paper needs to be augmented in
a number of directions to produce a moral hazard framework. In this extension we add some
properties of a moral hazard situation, but not all of them. In doing so we o¤er a model which
captures some of the basic features of the recent moral hazard debate on the role of the IMF
(e.g. IMF bail-outs can lead to a sub-optimally high probability of crises), but where …rst-best
e¤ort can be restored in equilibrium with an appropriate conditionality contract, so that, strictly
speaking, there is not a moral hazard problem.
The two features we add to the baseline model are as follows. Firstly, we assume that the
probability of crisis is endogenous, and a function of the agent’s (i.e. the debtor country’s) …rst
period e¤ort.39 In particular we assume that °(e1)=¹ ° ¡ ±ee1,w h e r e±e ¸ 0 and ¹ ° · 1.40
The agent therefore has some control over the probability of the negative event (i.e. the crisis)
taking place via its economic policies, and a moral hazard situation may occur if it provides
sub-optimal crisis-prevention e¤ort.
The second feature we add is that there is a level of unconditional funds (¯k, where ¯ 2 (0;1))
which the IMF always transfers to the debtor country in a situation of crisis. This may be due
to “global stability” considerations, which e¤ectively force the IMF to intervene even in the
absence of conditionality; or to an assumption that the Fund is constrained not to extract all
39In the following section of the paper we introduce investor moral hazard considerations using a similar reduced-
form approach, and assuming that ° is a function of k (capital in‡ows at t =1 )rather than of e1.I nb o t ht h i s
and the next extension we abstract from the direct e¤ect of the presence of the IMF on the probability of crisis
(as opposed to indirect e¤ects, via e1 and k). This direct e¤ect can be expected to be negative (i.e. the presence
of emergency IMF lending enhances the probability that investors will not su¤er capital losses in the event of a
crisis, therefore reducing the investors’ incentives to run - see e.g. Lane and Phillips (2000)). On the other hand
if an IMF bail-out partially …nances a run (see Zettelmeyer (2000)) it may actually increase the probability of a
crisis.
40Additional parameter restrictions, which are made explicit below, are necessary to ensure that ° ¸ 0 in
equilibrium.
25of the rents of its intervention from the debtor, for “political-economy” reasons (e.g. some ex-
post program “ownership” needs to be granted to the debtor).41 Assuming that ¯k is released
unconditionally is equivalent (in terms of its implications for the recipient’s utility) to assuming
that the optimal IMF contract is not fully implemented by the recipient so that there is some
unpunished ‘slippage’ (i.e. 1 · e2 <e c
2). The unconditional release of ¯k can therefore be
thought of as the outcome of IMF discretion in enforcing the baseline conditionality contract
(i.e. a lack of full commitment/bargaining power).
This second assumption is also necessary for a debtor moral hazard model to be developed:
without it (i.e. as in the baseline model) the IMF makes the individual rationality constraint
of the agent bind when it intervenes (i.e. it supplies the lowest feasible level of bail-out funds),
thereby not providing any “relief” to the debtor country from the occurrence of crisis and
therefore not reducing the incentives for the agent to avoid the crisis ex-ante. In addition, given
the binding IRC assumption, the IMF cannot use ex-post (or traditional) conditionality to
incentivise ex-ante e¤orts to prevent the crisis, since it cannot lower the debtor country’s payo¤
relative to its outside option (i.e. repaying the debt without bail-out or defaulting).42 If on
the other hand, as we assume in this section, the IMF leaves the debtor country’s participation
constraint slack following a crisis, the debtor country will face reduced incentives to avoid the
crisis ex-ante, implying that the Fund’s intervention causes some debtor moral hazard.
We also make the two following simplifying assumptions in this extension, in order to focus
the analysis on the issue of debtor moral hazard: the penalty rate p is “high enough”, so that
default is not an option for the debtor country if a crisis occurs;43 and the debtor country knows
the level of external debt k before setting its …rst-period e¤ort level e1; implying that it can set
it as a function of the expected cost a crisis.
4.2 Ex-ante Conditionality
In the absence of IMF conditionality, the debtor country sets e1 to maximise its expected utility,
and always sets e2 =1(given the assumption of high p). The optimal level of e1 (de…ned as e¤
1)













¡ (1 + ¸)k + ¸¯k)
where ¯k is the level of unconditional bail-out provided by the IMF in the event of a crisis.
This yields:
e¤
1(k;¯)=1+±e(1 + ¸(1 ¡ ¯))k (4)
which is decreasing in ¯ and increasing in k.F o r ¯>0 “moral hazard” therefore sets-in,
lowering the level of …rst period e¤ort below its …rst-best level eFB
1 (k) ´ 1+±e(1 + ¸)k (which
corresponds to the case of ¯ =0 ).
41Appendix A.3.2 explicitly derives the presence of ¯k unconditional transfers from an assumption of IMF
“altruism”. Alternatively, ¯k could be derived as the outcome of a bargain between the IMF and the recipient
country, which allows both parties to do better than their outside option, and which therefore would leave some
rents to the recipient.
42That is, IMF conditionality cannot act as co-insurance, as implicitly suggested by Fischer (1999).
43This is equivalent to assuming that k · k
D. It implies that the debtor always repays ¯k to the Fund at the
end of t =2 , so that the net impact of the IMF’s unconditional loan on the debtor’s utility equals ¸¯k.
26How can the IMF mitigate this moral hazard e¤ect? One direct way would be to commit not
to release ¯k unconditionally after a crisis, and instead commit to o¤er a conditionality contract
of the form modelled in the baseline framework of this paper, which makes the IRC binding (and
which would therefore induce …rst-best …rst-period e¤ort). Ex-post this is however not credible,
given the assumption of limited IMF commitment power introduced in this section, and would
not be a sub-game perfect outcome. Ex-post conditionality therefore cannot avoid moral hazard.
Another instrument to mitigate moral hazard which does not rely on the IMF’s ability to
commit to be “tough” ex-post, is ex-ante conditionality, that is conditionality on the …rst-period
e¤ort level. This would consist of an o¤er by the IMF of a higher bail-out in the event of a crisis
(i.e. b>¯ k ) in exchange for a level of …rst period e¤ort e1 which is above e¤
1.44 This contract is
similar to an insurance contract, where the premium paid by the recipient is in the form of higher
crisis-prevention e¤orts.45 It is also closely related to the “pre-quali…cation” (or “selectivity”)
proposals put forward by a number of commentators recently (e.g. Goldstein (2000), the IFIAC
(Meltzer) Report (2000) and, in the related context of conditional aid, Collier et al. (1997)), and
partially adopted by the Fund with the introduction of a new facility (the Contingent Credit
Line (CCL)) in 1999.46
The optimal ex-ante conditionality contract fec
1;b cg is derived from the following program:47
max
e1;b
E(UIMF)=°(e1)(1 ¡ b)+( 1¡ °(e1))
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is the reservation two-period expected utility of the recipient, obtained by setting e1 = e¤
1 and
receiving ¯k if a crisis takes place. As in the baseline model, we assume that the Fund does not
directly bene…t from …rst period reform e¤orts.48 Given this assumption, the IMF’s objective
with ex-ante conditionality therefore boils down to the minimisation of its expected bail-out
°(e1)b, i.e. the IMF o¤ers an ex-ante contract in order to safeguard its resources ex-post.
Figure 9 illustrates the IMF’s ex-ante program, showing its formal similarity with baseline
ex-post conditionality (see Figure 2). Also in this case we can plot the agent’s IRC in (b;e)
space, showing here …rst–period e¤ort, and illustrate how higher (expected) bail-out funds can
purchase higher e¤ort. In Figure 9 we show a situation where the b · k constraint does not
44This requires us to assume that the IMF is able to commit not to abuse the trust of the debtor country
ex-post (i.e. if a crisis takes place), which is a more reasonable assumption to make than the one of “commitment
to be tough” (i.e. never releasing ¯k unconditionally), given the institutional nature of the Fund.
45Given risk-neutrality, the agent is not bene…ting from insurance per se, but rather from the additional net
transfer received from the IMF in period 2, which is traded-o¤ with extra e¤ort in period 1. Note that of course
the IMF could make this transfer in period 1, thus directly purchasing a higher e1. We do not allow for this
because it would violate the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, whilst ex-ante conditionality is consistent with them
(i.e. the transfer from the IMF to the recipient occurs only in the event of balance of payments disequilibrium
and is in the form of a loan).
46See Appendix A.1 for a description of the CCL.
47The “adequate safeguards” constraint does not apply given our assumption of a su¢ciently high p.N o t et h a t
this assumption also implies that we can set e2 equal to 1.
48Allowing for this would be straightforward but would not allow us to focus exclusively on the debtor moral
hazard prevention role of conditionality, which is the aim of this extension.
27bind, so that …rst-period e¤ort can be restored to the …rst-best via ex-ante conditionality, as



















Figure 9: The ex-ante conditionality program.
Proposition 3 describes the properties of the optimal ex-ante conditionality contract.
Proposition 3
(i) For k low enough (i.e. k · kT(¯) ´
2(1¡¯)(¹ °¡±e)
±2
e(¯2¸+2(1+¸)(1¡¯))), we have that bc · k;°(ec
1) ¸ 0
and the IMF can apply …rst-best ex-ante conditionality, which is as follows:
ec
1 = eFB










(ii) If k 2 (kT(¯);kU(¯)], then ex-ante conditionality can only elicit second-best e¤ort by the
agent and the b · k constraint binds. Therefore:
ec
1 = eSB




kU(¯) is given the condition °(e¤
1(¯;k)) = 0, which yields kU(¯)=
¹ °¡±e
±2
e(1+¸(1¡¯)) ¸ kT(¯).A t
k = kU(¯),w eh a v eec
1 = e¤
1(¯;k): Values of k higher than kU(¯) are ruled out because of the
non-negativity constraint on °(e1).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.2.
Figure 10 illustrates the results given in Proposition 3. The left hand panel plots the two
threshold schedules of k described in the Proposition: kT(¯),b e l o ww h i c h… r s t - b e s te x - a n t e
conditionality can be imposed; and kU(¯), which gives the upper bound on acceptable values of
k (to satisfy the non-negativity constraint on °); and is also the locus of values of k such that
28no ex-ante conditionality is imposed by the Fund (i.e. ec
1 = e¤
1). The right hand panel plots
the corresponding values of …rst-best e¤ort, with and without ex-ante conditionality, for a given
value of ¯ (i.e. ¯ = ¯0). Conditional e¤ort departs from the …rst-best for k>k T(¯),a n di t










































Figure 10: The ex-ante conditionality contract.
Proposition 3 shows that if k,t h ec a p i t a li n ‡ o wa tt =1 , is su¢ciently low relative to the
degree of unconditional IMF ex-post support (measured by ¯), ex-ante conditionality can restore
…rst-best e¤ort in the pre-crisis period by means of the promise of a higher bail-out in the event
of a crisis. However, if k is relatively high, the b · k constraint binds, and the IMF needs to
settle for second-best ex-ante conditionality. This is because high level of capital in‡ows in the
…rst period imply a greater wedge between e¤
1 and eFB
1 . Given the increasing marginal cost of
e¤ort for the debtor, this implies that bc(k) under …rst-best ex-ante conditionality is strictly
convex in k, so that there is a level a threshold level of k (de…ned here as kT (¯))b e y o n dw h i c h
b · k binds and the IMF can only impose second-best conditionality. This threshold level of k
is decreasing in ¯, which measures how ‘close’ the IMF already is to the b · k constraint in the
second period, and it tends to 0 as ¯ t e n d st o1( s e eF i g u r e1 0 ) .
An implication of this result is that “important” (or high-¯) countries (i.e. those which re-
ceive more unconditional support from the IMF in the event of a crisis) are subject to less intense
ex-ante conditionality ceteris paribus, and that their ex-ante policy may still be characterised by
m o r a lh a z a r di ns p i t eo ft h eI M Fe x - a n t ei n t e r v e n t i o n .I M Fd i s c r e t i o n( w h i c hi sm e a s u r e db y¯)
therefore acts as a budget constraint on the Fund’s debtor moral hazard prevention activities,
making …rst-best pre-crisis e¤ort unattainable, for large enough levels of external debt.
Second-best conditionality converges to the no-conditionality outcome as k increases further
beyond kT(¯). This is due to the fact that high levels of capital in‡ows increase the agent’s
…rst-best period e¤ort also in the absence of conditionality, lowering the probability of a crisis
taking place. If k is high enough, the agent …nds it optimal to drive this probability to 0 even
29without conditionality (i.e. setting e1 =
°
±e), implying that the IMF’s unconditional bail-out ¯k
never materialises and that the Fund has therefore no incentives to apply ex-ante conditionality.
For this level of k (i.e. k = kH(¯)) the …rst and second-best levels of …rst-period e¤ort e¤ectively
converge, given that they are both constrained by the °(e1) ¸ 0 condition (see Figure 10).
Proposition 3 also reveals that the IMF does not face incentives to use ex-ante conditionality
to increase the agent’s level of e¤ort in period 1 beyond the …rst-best level (i.e. the level which
is optimal for the agent if ¯ =0 ). This is because the purpose of ex-ante conditionality as we
have modelled in this extension is to minimise the expected use of IMF resources at t =2 .49
Expected bail-out minimisation implies the maximisation of expected recipient utility net of the
IMF bail-out (given the presence of the binding IRC(¯)), which by de…nition is achieved by
setting e1 = eFB
1 . The IMF therefore only departs from imposing ex-ante …rst-best e¤ort if it
faces a binding budget constraint, due to the b · k restriction.
4.3 Discussion
This section of the paper has examined under what conditions the presence of the IMF can
induce “moral hazard” on the part of the debtor country. We have shown that this takes place if
the IMF cannot commit not to intervene in the event of a crisis in the absence of agreement on
an ex-post conditionality package (or, alternatively, if it in‡ates bail-outs or allows for program-
slippage under ex-post conditionality, thus not making the agent’s constraint bind). If this is the
case, ex-ante conditionality can be used to eliminate (or at least reduce) debtor moral hazard.
Our modelling of ex-ante conditionality (or “pre-quali…cation”) is in contrast to some of the
current discussion of this issue in the context of the IFA debate, where this is seen as incompatible
with Fund lending to non-prequali…ed countries and a justi…cation for Fund inaction when a crisis
hits these countries (e.g. as in the “pre-qualify and stand-by” approach advocated by IFIAC
(2000)). In our model ex-ante conditionality is motivated by the inability of the Fund to credibly
stand-by in the event of large crises. In this sense it is more consistent with current Fund
practice, where ex-ante facilities (such as the CCL) co-exist with traditional ex-post lending.
The discussion of ex-ante conditionality presented in this section also points to a potentially
important trade-o¤ between traditional ex-post conditionality and ex-ante contracts. The Fund
will face a trade-o¤ between these two, at the margin, given the presence of a common budget
constraint, which is due to the fact that overall IMF lending b cannot exceed capital out‡ows
k. An increase in ex-ante conditionality (i.e. the promise of additional unconditional funds if a
crisis occurs) lowers the availability of funds for ex-post conditionality, which is needed to induce
higher reform e¤orts and, where relevant, avoid outright default, during a crisis.
This …nancial trade-o¤ may imply a choice for the Fund between crisis prevention and the
minimisation of the expected recourse to its funds on the one hand, and the safeguarding of its
lending via conditionality on ex-post e¤ort on the other. If the Fund is constrained to maximise
the extent to which its loans are repaid by debtor countries (e.g. because of its Articles of
Agreement), it will face a bias in favour of ex-post conditionality. This in turn could lead to a
49Additional motives for the Fund to impose ex-ante conditionality would be present if the Fund was directly
concerned with reform e¤ort at t =1 , or if the IMF faced an opportunity cost from a crisis outcome which
exceeded the cost of releasing unconditional bail-out funds. The latter can be introduced by assuming that the
Fund earns a reservation utility if a crisis does not take place. This is the approach we follow in the next section
of the paper, to analyse the issue of investor moral hazard.
30sub-optimally high probability of crises taking place, and an excessive recourse to Fund bail-outs.
5 Private Sector Involvement (PSI) and Investor Moral Hazard
One of the more controversial issues in the current debate on how to reform the international
…nancial architecture is the one of investor ‘moral hazard’ and of the appropriate degree of
Private Sector Involvement (PSI)50 in crisis-resolution (see, e.g., Goldstein (2000), Eichengreen
(2000) and Lane and Phillips (2000)). Many commentators (including the IMF) recognise that
investor behaviour and incentives have a signi…cant bearing on both crisis prevention and crisis
resolution, and that the moral hazard induced by IMF intervention is a two-sided issue (i.e.
involving investors as much as debtors).
Papers which discuss the issue of PSI in the context of the IFA (such as the ones cited above)
are largely informal, and focus either on the mechanisms by which PSI can be implemented (e.g.
IMF-sanctioned payments standstills and Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in bond contracts),
or on the empirical question of whether investor moral hazard is a serious concern (see Lane
and Phillips (2000)). In this section of the paper we formalise some of the insights on the
rationale of PSI which are discussed in the IFA debate, and emphasize the role of PSI within
the overall bail-out/conditionality package designed by the IMF in the aftermath of a balance
of payments crisis. Modelling the issue of PSI within the general agency model presented in this
paper enables us to identify the kind of trade-o¤s faced by the IMF in devising a PSI-policy, and
to analyse the role of the link between PSI and investor moral hazard in a¤ecting the Fund’s
position towards PSI.
To introduce the possibility of PSI in crisis resolution we augment the baseline conditionality
model presented in Section 2 by allowing for debt relief.51 That is, we allow investors to forgive
some of the debt which the country owes to them following a crisis realisation. This might be
done directly, if investors are able to co-ordinate their actions, or via the IMF, in the context
of an IMF bail-out package. In what follows we …rstly analyse the no-IMF benchmark level of
PSI; we then examine the IMF’s ex-post optimal PSI-policy, i.e. the extent of PSI which the
IMF favours following a crisis occurrence; and, thirdly, we allow for investor moral hazard, and
model under what circumstances the IMF might want to depart from its ex-post optimal PSI
policy to mitigate investor moral hazard ex-ante.
Throughout this section we denote debt repayment as kr, whilst k,a sa b o v e ,d e n o t e st h e
exogenous level of capital in‡ows at t =1 , and therefore the maximum debt repayment investors
can demand if a crisis takes place.52 We also introduce a new variable Ã,w h i c hm e a s u r e st h e
extent of PSI which occurs after a crisis. Debt-repayment is therefore negatively related to Ã (i.e.
@kr(Ã)
@Ã < 0) and, as we show below, it is convenient to express it using the following functional
form: kr =( 1¡ Ã)kD.
50This is sometimes referred to as ‘burden-sharing’ or private sector ‘bail-in’.
51We therefore use the terms debt relief and PSI interchangeably in what follows. Another form of PSI, which
we do not formally consider here but which is partially discusssed in Section 3.1, is debt rescheduling.
52In Section 5.3 we endogenise k, following the approach introduced in Section 3.2, and we denote capital in‡ows
at t =1as k
¤.
315.1 PSI without the IMF
Without IMF bail-outs investors collectively have incentives to forgive all debt beyond kD.T h i s
is because in the absence of debt-relief and for k>k D, default takes place, and debt-overhang
sets in. If this is the case, repayment by the debtor takes the form of the “gun-boat” penalty
p
1+¸e¤
2,s ot h a tkr =
p
1+¸(1 ¡ p) ´ (1 ¡ ¹ Ã)kD, where ¹ Ã ´
p
2¡p > 0. ¹ Ã denotes the maximum
level of PSI investor can su¤er from in the event of a crisis. If, on the other hand, the investors
forgive all debt above kD, they can induce both e2 =1and the full repayment of kD,s ot h a t
kr = kD > (1 ¡ ¹ Ã)kD.I ft h i si st h ec a s e ,Ã =0 .53
Relief of all debt beyond kD is therefore a Pareto e¢cient outcome, given that it removes
the tax on e¤ort present with debt-overhang (i.e. it induces e¢cient domestic production) and
it raises debt-repayment (as in the classic model by Sachs (1989a)54). It however may not occur
if there are multiple creditors who fail to co-ordinate and grant relief collectively. Depending on
whether investors can co-ordinate e¤ectively, the no-IMF benchmark level of the PSI variable is
therefore either 0 or ¹ Ã.
In the rest of this section of the paper, where we consider the IMF’s optimal PSI policy, we
assume that investors cannot co-ordinate their debt-relief o¤er, so that Ã = ¹ Ã in the absence of
the IMF.
5.2 PSI with the IMF
We next consider the possibility of debt-relief in the context of IMF conditionality. In our set-up
the IMF can e¤ectively decide how much debt relief to grant to the debtor country, by making its
bail-out conditional on both the e¤ort exercised in the second period and the amount of capital
repaid to the creditor (which may be below k). The optimal IMF contract therefore speci…es
three variables: ec
2, bc and Ãc.
In o¤ering this three-variable contract the IMF needs to satisfy both the debtor and the
investors’ participation constraint. The latter can be represented by the following condition:
Ã · ¹ Ã (Investors’ IRC), given our assumption that the investors are not able to collectively
negotiate the e¢cient level of debt relief (i.e. set Ã =0after a crisis). We assume that if both
IRCs are met, the contract is accepted by both parties and, in particular, the investors refrain
from demanding any further debt-repayment and/or applying the gun-boat penalty pe2.
We consider in what follows three cases for the IMF’s PSI-policy. The …rst two relate to
two possible attitudes of the Fund’s toward PSI (PSI-aversion and PSI-tolerance), and allow us
to identify two benchmark cases for the Fund’s PSI policy. The third case, which we examine
in the next sub-section, allows for investor moral hazard, and explores its implications on the
Fund’s optimal ex-ante PSI policy.
In both this and the next-subsection we restrict our attention to the cases where initial
investment k is above kD, which implies that the IMF has some ‡exibility in the determination
of its PSI-policy (i.e. for k · kD, the investor recovers the entirety of its initial investment, even
in the absence of the IMF, so that there is no PSI).
53This does not imply that PSI is minimised, given that in the case of IMF intervention negative values of Ã
are also possible, as it is shown below.
54The insight that it is preferable to set a …xed level of external debt rather than a variable income-dependent
(and therefore distortionary) one is forcefully argued by Keynes (1919).
325.2.1 PSI-aversion
The …rst possibility we consider is that the IMF is PSI-averse, and that its preferences are
lexicographic in debt relief (i.e. in the amount of un-paid debt): the IMF …rst minimises PSI,
and then maximises its utility function, as speci…ed in Section 2 (i.e. UIMF = e2 ¡ b).55
These preferences imply that relief is only optimal for k>k H, and that debt-repayment kr
therefore equals min((1¡Ã)kD;k),s ot h a tÃc = Ã ´¡ ¸.T h i si sb e c a u s e ,w h e nk>k H, limiting
debt-repayment to kH allows for some conditionality to be imposed (in particular, ec
2 =1and
bc = kH, from Proposition 1(ii)), which gives the Fund utility of 1 ¡ kH. T h i si sh i g h e rt h a n
1¡p, the level obtained in the no-relief (and therefore no-conditionality) outcome. In addition,
for k>k H, the combination of conditionality and debt-relief implies a lower level of un-paid
debt than the alternative (i.e. k ¡ (1 ¡ Ã)kD rather than k ¡ (1 ¡ ¹ Ã)kD).
A PSI-averse IMF therefore maximises re-payment to the creditors, and allows for debt-relief
only to the extent to which this enables it to be in a position to exercise some conditionality.
This has the e¤ect of reducing the extent to which PSI takes place after crises, relative to a
situation with no IMF lending: PSI occurs only for high levels of debt (k>k H), and debt-
repayment is always higher than in the no-IMF benchmark (as long as k>k D). A relief-averse
IMF therefore does not make the investors’ IRC bind (Ãc < ¹ Ã). Given that the debtor country
is e¤ectively indi¤erent relative to the IMF’s bail-out (its IRC binds), this implies that most
of the e¢ciency gains from the IMF’s provision of emergency lending are appropriated by the
foreign investors.
5.2.2 PSI-tolerance
An alternative possibility for the attitude of the IMF vis-à-vis debt relief is what we term here
PSI-tolerance. A PSI-tolerant IMF trades-o¤ PSI minimisation with its other two objectives of
promoting reform e¤ort and minimising its bail-outs, after a crisis has occurred. It therefore
maximises the following function:
UIMF = e2 ¡ b ¡ (k ¡ kr(Ã))
If this is the case IMF …nds it optimal to set Ãc =0 , i.e. set kr = kD, like in the no-IMF
debt-relief equilibrium described above, when investors were able to co-ordinate their actions
after a crisis.
This result can be seen by considering the Fund’s utility as a function of Ã, in the range
kr(Ã) 2 [kr(¹ Ã);kr(Ã)] (which ensures that the investors’ IRC is met). It is possible to express
UIMF solely as a function of Ã,b yr e p l a c i n ge2 and b with their optimal levels as a function of
55It is possible to interpret a PSI-averse IMF as one which is ‘captured’ by foreign investors, and whose main
concern is therefore the recovery of their capital. PSI-aversion is the natural (and more moderate) extension of
the assumption on IMF behaviour used in Section 2, whereby full debt repayment (i.e. no relief) is a pre-condition
for IMF intervention following a crisis.
33debt repayment kr(Ã).56 UIMF(Ã) is therefore as follows (after some simpli…cation):
UIMF(Ã)=
8
> > > <
> > > :
ec
2(kr(Ã)) ¡ k for kr(Ã) 2 (kM;kr(Ã) ´ kH]
1+¸
2 ¡ (k ¡ kD)+kD
¸ Ã for kr(Ã) 2 (kD;kM]
1+¸
2 ¡ k +( 1¡ Ã)kD
ec
2(kr(Ã)) ¡ k
for kr(Ã) 2 (¸
2;kD]
for kr(Ã) 2 [kr(¹ Ã); ¸
2]
(5)
which assumes that k>k H and kr(¹ Ã) < ¸
2.57
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Figure 11: The IMF’s marginal bene…t from PSI.
This shows that the IMF’s marginal utility of PSI is positive for kr(Ã) 2 (kD;kH],i . e .f o r
Ã 2 [Ã;0) , and it is negative for Ã>0 (see Figure 11). A PSI-tolerant IMF therefore …nds
it optimal to set Ãc =0 . T h i si ss ob e c a u s ef o rkr(Ã) 2 (kM;kH] any increase in debt-relief
implies a one-to-one reduction in the level of the bail-out (given that bc = kr(Ã) in that range),
and it also has a positive impact on adjustment e¤ort (which is decreasing in kr(Ã) in that
range), therefore leading to a positive net marginal impact of PSI for the Fund. In the range
56These are given by the solutions for e
c
2 and b
c in Proposition 1, substituting k
r(Ã) for k (i.e. relaxing the
assumption implicit in Proposition 1 that all foreign debt is repaid).
57If the …rst condition does not hold, the k
r · k constraint will bind for k
r · k
H, limiting the range of k
r(Ã)
which the IMF can consider.
If the second condition does not hold, there are only three ranges of k
r(Ã) which need to be considered for the
purposes of computing U
IMF(Ã), given that the investors’ IRC rules out the fourth.
34kr 2 (kD;kM] on the other hand, reform e¤ort is una¤ected by the amount of debt-relief (given
that it is at …rst-best anyway) but bail-outs are reduced by more than one-to-one in response
to any given debt relief (i.e. @bc
@kr(Ã) = 1+¸
¸ , from the debtor’s IRC), again implying a positive
marginal impact of PSI. Any PSI beyond Ã =0however has a negative marginal utility, given
that its negative impact on the intensity of reform e¤ort and on the level of debt-repayment.
The optimal PSI policy for a relief-tolerant IMF is therefore to set Ãc =0 , which allows it
to implement …rst-best conditionality, i.e. ec
2 =1+¸ and bc = ¸
2. This also allows the Fund
to fully relax the “adequate safeguards constraint” (ASC), ensuring that the recipient of the
bail-out never has an incentive to default on the IMF, even for low values of p.
This combined conditionality-PSI contract leaves no rents to the investors if their outside
option is one of co-ordinated debt-relief (i.e. their IRC binds if this is the case). If, on the other
hand, investors are unable to co-ordinate their debt relief e¤ort, IMF intervention e¤ectively
reduces PSI, and leads to a positive gain for investors, which is exactly equal to the bene…ts
from being able to co-ordinate.
5.3 PSI and Investor Moral Hazard
The results presented so far in this section show how the nature of ex-post conditionality and the
IMF’s attitude towards debt-repayment a¤ect the Fund’s PSI policy. In particular they clarify
the role of PSI within the overall conditionality package o¤ered by the IMF following a crisis,
showing that PSI is a tool the IMF can use to enhance its leverage in a post-crisis situation.
Another consideration which is likely to play a signi…cant role in shaping the IMF’s PSI
policy, and which is currently attracting considerable attention in the IFA debate, is the one
of investor moral hazard. Like in the case of debtor moral hazard (see Section 4), this can be
interpreted as referring to a situation where pre-crisis investor behaviour leads to a sub-optimal
probability of a crisis taking place. This section explores the implications of the presence of moral
hazard on the part of foreign investors on the IMF’s optimal PSI and conditionality policy. We
assume in this section that the IMF is relief-tolerant, and that its ex-post optimal PSI policy is
therefore to set Ãc =0 . We also assume that the IMF is able to pre-commit ex-ante (i.e. before
a crisis) to any PSI policy, even if this is ex-post sub-optimal. The purpose of this extension is
to model the impact of PSI on investor moral hazard, and understand whether and under what
circumstances the IMF might want to ex-ante deviate from its ex-post optimal PSI policy.
5.3.1 Extended Set-up
F o ra ni n v e s t o rm o r a lh a z a r ds i t u a t i o nt oa r i s ew en e e dt om a k et w oa d d i t i o n st oo u rb a s i c
set-up, in a similar fashion to the debtor moral hazard extension modelled in Section 4. Firstly,
the probability of crisis occurring ° needs to be a function of capital in‡ows before a crisis.
Secondly, the IMF needs to …nd a crisis event costly, so that it is concerned with mitigating
investor moral hazard.
Endogenous crisis and capital in‡ows We endogenise investment (i.e. foreign capital
in‡ows in period 1) as in the analysis of credit rationing presented in Section 3.2. The only
di¤erence we introduce here is that the probability of crisis is a function of investment behaviour,
35according to the following linear function:
°(k)=¹ ° + ±kk
where ¹ °>0 and ±k > 0.58 This is intended to capture, in reduced form, the fact that the
higher the level of foreign debt of a given country, the more likely it is that it will be subject to
a sudden and unexpected balance of payments crisis.59
Given the domestic production function introduced in Section 3.2, and our earlier assumption
that PSI is maximised (i.e. Ã = ¹ Ã) if a crisis occurs without IMF intervention, optimal foreign
capital in‡ows at t =1 , k¤(Ã), and debt repayment if a crisis takes place, kr(Ã),a r eg i v e nb y





® for ®<k D
kD for ® 2 [kD; ^ ®(¹ Ã)]
^ k(¹ Ã) for ®>^ ®(¹ Ã)
) kr(¹ Ã)=
(
k¤ for ® · ^ ®(¹ Ã)
(1 ¡ ¹ Ã)kD for ®>^ ®(¹ Ã)
(7)
where ^ ®(Ã)=¹ ° +( 1+±k(1 + Ã))kD and ^ k(Ã)=
®¡¹ °+±k(1¡Ã)kD
1+2±k (see Figure 12 for an
illustration of k¤(¹ Ã)).
Relative to the optimal investment schedule with a …xed probability of crisis (see equation
(2)), capital ‡ows are now less sensitive to the productivity of foreign investment if default is
the ex-post outcome in the event of a crisis (i.e. @k¤
@® < 1 for ®>^ ®(¹ Ã)); and the threshold level
of productivity of foreign investment above which investors are willing to accept a capital loss in
the event of a crisis (de…ned as ^ ®(¹ Ã) here) is higher. Investors therefore internalise some of the
moral hazard due to their behaviour, and lend capital to the debtor country more prudently.
In the presence of IMF bail-outs both the optimal investment function (k¤(Ã)) and the
repaid investment function (kr(Ã)) can be generalised as a function of the IMF’s choice of the
PSI variable Ã if a crisis takes place, as long as Ã 2 (0; ¹ Ã):60 This is the case given our assumption
that the IMF is be able to commit, before a crisis, to any (ex-post) PSI policy, which allows it
to therefore a¤ect ex-ante investment and the probability of a crisis taking place.
In particular, ^ ®(Ã) is a positive function of PSI (i.e. the lower PSI, the less likely is it that
investment will be constrained at kD); and ^ k(Ã) is negative function of PSI (i.e. the lower PSI,
the higher the level of capital ‡ows for a given value of ®).
Figure 12 summarises the optimal investment schedule at t =1 , as a function of the produc-
tivity of foreign investment ® and the level of PSI if a crisis takes place.
58In equilibrium the following condition needs to hold to ensure that °(k) · 1 for ® 2 [0;1]:




59Like in the case of debtor moral hazard, we do not seek to model the process of crisis-determination in detail
here. We introduce it as a simple reduced form relationship, to enable us to provide a stylised model of investor
moral hazard.
60Negative values of Ã imply that investors recover more than k
D in the event of a crisis (as it is the case with
a relief-averse IMF). If this is the case, investment is rationed relative to the no-crisis benchmark for values of
® greater than k
D. We do not consider the case of IMF relief-aversion in this extension, and we can therefore
restrict Ã to be non-negative.
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Figure 12: Optimal capital ‡ows at t =1as a function of PSI.
Costly crisis T h es e c o n da d d i t i o nw em a k et oo u rb a s e l i n es e t - u ph e r ei st oa s s u m et h a tt h e
IMF always prefers a no-crisis outcome to a crisis one. In the debtor moral hazard case this was
the case because of the presence of a level of unconditional bail-out funds ¯k which the IMF had
to disburse in the event of crisis (and which also generated the debtor moral hazard problem);
here we assume, for simplicity, an exogenous loss to the IMF from a crisis, which takes the form
of a reservation utility ¹ U, which the IMF earns if a crisis does not take place.
We set ¹ U to be higher than the IMF’s maximum utility if a crisis takes place (which is
obtained by setting Ãc =0 ;e c
2 =1+¸ and bc = ¸
2), so that the IMF always …nds a crisis costly,
independently of the e¤ectiveness of its crisis-resolution. This implies the following restriction
on ¹ U:




(1 + ±k)kD +¹ ° ¡ ®
1+2 ±k
Why is there investor moral hazard ? The fact that the Fund (i.e. the principal) always
…nds a crisis costly, and that foreign investors (i.e. the agent, in this set-up) have some control
over the likelihood of a crisis taking place, generates a moral hazard setting (in the sense discussed
in the case of debtor moral hazard): the agent may not autonomously choose an e¢cient level
of investment from the principal’s point of view.
As in the case of debtor moral hazard, the potential for ine¢cient agent behaviour is gener-
ated by the presence of IMF ‘insurance’: it is the Fund’s inability (or unwillingness) to make the
agent’s participation constraint bind ex-post which is at the root of the moral hazard problem.
In the debtor’s case this was by assumption (i.e. in Section 4 we assumed that the Fund could
n o tc o m m i tn o tt ot r a n s f e r¯k unconditionally if a crisis took place). In the case of investor
moral hazard the investors’ IRC may be slack because of the Fund’s ex-post incentives to in-
crease debt repayment to creditors relative to the no-IMF benchmark, to be able to maximise
the e¤ectiveness of its conditionality (i.e. obtain the most favourable combination of debtor
37reform e¤ort and bail-out). This increases the investors’ utility in a crisis situation relative to
a no-IMF counterfactual, inducing an increase in ex-ante capital in‡ows which in turn increases
the likelihood of the crisis occurring.
As we show in the next sub-section, given both the ex-ante and ex-post impact of its PSI
policy, the IMF may …nd it optimal to accept an inferior crisis resolution outcome and commit
to make the investors’ IRC bind ex-post, in order to deter capital in‡ows at t =1 , and reduce
investor moral hazard. As we show below, the IMF will have incentives to depart from ex-post
optimum PSI (Ãc =0 ) and pre-commit to a positive level of Ã i ft h ec r i s i si ss u ¢ c i e n t l yc o s t l y
and if the impact of capital in‡ows on the probability of crisis is relatively high.
5.3.2 The IMF’s Optimal Choice of PSI
The IMF’s PSI program consists of the maximisation of its expected utility at t =1with respect
to the PSI variable Ã, subject to both the debtor’s and the investors’ IRCs. As shown above, in
the case of the relief-tolerant IMF, any choice of Ã (as long as the IMF can commit to it ex-ante,
and that it respects the investors’ IRC) uniquely determines the optimal levels of e¤ort level
and the bail-out at t =2if a crisis takes place. This allows us to express the Fund’s ex-ante
utility uniquely as a function of Ã, and also to ignore the constraints associated with ex-post
conditionality, since these are met by the optimal baseline conditionality contract implied by Ã:




V (Ã)=( 1 ¡ °(Ã))¹ U + °(Ã)(U(Ã)) (8)
s:t: : Ã<¹ Ã (Investors’ IRC)
where °(Ã) is short form for °(k¤(Ã)); and U(Ã) denotes the Fund’s utility if a crisis occurs
and optimal (ex-post) conditionality is implemented with debt-repayment equal to kr(Ã). U(Ã)
is given by equation (5), omitting the IMF superscript for notational simplicity. k¤(Ã) and kr(Ã)
are given by equation (7), substituting Ã for ¹ Ã.
A …rst step to note for the solution to this program is that we can restrict our attention to
positive values of Ã, given the assumption of IMF PSI-tolerance, which implies that the ex-post
optimal Ã is 0. The only reason for the IMF to depart from this level is to reduce the probability
of a crisis occurring by increasing Ã, which implies that any level of Ã less than 0 has to be
sub-optimal ex-ante.
A second simpli…cation of the program is to note that optimal solution for Ã depends on
the value of ®, the productivity of investing abroad for the investor at t =1 .61 It is possible
to incorporate the e¤ect of di¤erent values of this parameter on the IMF’s optimal choice of Ã
by amending the investors’ IRC, i.e. limiting the range of possible values of Ãc.I f ®>^ ®(¹ Ã),
then any value of Ãc lower than ¹ Ã has an impact on ex-ante investment behaviour and on the
probability of crisis. If however ® 2 [^ ®(0); ^ ®(¹ Ã)]; t h e nt h ec h o i c eo fÃ by the IMF has an impact
on ex-ante capital ‡ows only if Ãc < ^ ®¡1(®), i.e. if PSI is low enough, relative to ®,s ot h a t
61Note that the IMF’s program is uninteresting if ®<^ ®(0) given that if this is the case k
¤ (Ã) <k
D always,
and the Fund’s PSI policy cannot a¤ect ex-ante capital ‡ows. This in turn implies that the ex-ante optimal level
of PSI coincides with the ex-post optimum, i.e. Ã
c =0 : We can therefore restrict our attention to cases where
® ¸ ^ ®(0).
38ex-ante investment reacts positively to the level of PSI chosen by the Fund. If Ã is above this
threshold value, ex-ante investment remains constrained at kD (i.e. the investor prefers to avoid
the risk of default), and the IMF’s PSI policy is not capable of a¤ecting the probability of the
crisis occurring. Given that the only reason why a relief-tolerant IMF might wish to depart
from its ex-post optimal policy of Ãc =0is to reduce the probability of a crisis taking place
by increasing PSI, values of Ã above ^ ®¡1(®) can be ruled out as solutions to the IMF’s ex-ante
program. This implies that we can impose Ãc < min(¹ Ã; ^ ®¡1(®)) ´ ^ Ã. Accounting for the
implications of IMF relief-tolerance noted above, the range of possible values of Ãc is therefore
Ã 2 [0; ^ Ã]:
Given the above restriction on the possible values of Ã, it is straightforward to derive that
V (Ã) is convex in Ã,i . e .V 00(Ã)=2 °0(Ã)U0(Ã) > 0,a sl o n ga skr(¹ Ã) > ¸
2 (which implies that
U00(Ã)=0 ).62 This is because both °0(Ã) and U0(Ã) are negative for Ã 2 [0; ^ Ã]:63 This in turn
implies that there is no interior solution to the IMF’s ex-ante program and that, depending on
parameter values, the IMF will either choose to set Ãc =0(i.e. follow its ex-post optimal PSI
policy) or to set Ãc = ^ Ã (i.e. pre-commit to a higher level of PSI to deter capital in‡ows).64
Substitution of the values for these two corner solutions into equation (8) shows that V (^ Ã) >
V (0) (i.e. Ãc = ^ Ã>0) if the following condition holds:
±2








¹ U ,a n dF ´
±k(®¡¹ °)
1+2±k +( 1+±k)¹ °>0.
C(PSI) shows that the IMF …nds it optimal to pre-commit to increase PSI relative to its
ex-post optimal level if both ±k and ¹ U are high enough - i.e. the level of capital in‡ows has
a su¢ciently high impact on the probability of crisis, and the crisis is su¢ciently costly. In
particular ¹ U needs to be strictly higher than ¹ Umin for C(PSI) to be satis…ed. De…ning ¢¹ U =






+( 1¡ ^ Ã)kD
i
> 0. Figure 13 illustrates
the ratio ¢¹ U
¹ Umin as a function of ±k, showing how for low values of ±k, ¹ U needs to be considerably






2 is necessary to set U





00,w h i c h ,f o rU
00 negative enough, might be negative. If this is the case, there might
be an interior solution to the ex-ante IMF program (i.e. the investors’ IRC never binds), which would still imply
the possibility of a departure from the ex-post optimal PSI policy of setting Ã
c =0 . The main policy implication







0 (Ã) is given by equation (6).
64The reason why no interior solution exists to the IMF’s ex-ante PSI program can be seen by considering the
marginal bene…t and marginal cost to the IMF of increasing PSI relative to 0 and moving towards ^ Ã.T h e… r s t
d e r i v a t i v eo ft h eF u n d ’ se x - a n t eu t i l i t yi sa sf o l l o w s :
V
0(Ã)=¡°
0(Ã)(¹ U ¡ U(Ã)) + °(Ã)U
0(Ã)
The …rst term of this expression can be interpreted as the marginal bene…t of increasing Ã above 0: the reduction
in the probability of a crisis times the opportunity cost of a crisis. This is positive and increasing in Ã,g i v e nt h a t
U
0(Ã) < 0 and °
00(Ã)=0 . The negative of the second term is the marginal cost of increasing Ã: the expected
loss in utility if a crisis occurs. This is decreasing in Ã; given that U
0(Ã) is constant and ° (Ã) is decreasing in
Ã. Therefore, when deciding whether to depart from its ex-post optimum of Ã
c =0 , the IMF is faced with an
increasing marginal bene…t schedule, and a decreasing marginal cost one: if it is bene…cial to increase Ã above 0
it is therefore always optimal to do so as much as possible (i.e. make the investors’ IRC bind, whenever possible).


















This example assumes λ= p =15%; γ = 10%.
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This example assumes λ= p =15%; γ = 10%.
δk=0.61
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Figure 13: Threshold values for ¢¹ U
¹ Umin as a function of ±k.
Summarising the results obtained in this sub-section, we have found that there are conditions
under which the IMF faces incentives to use its PSI policy to reduce the incidence of investor
moral hazard and, by implication, the level of ex-ante capital in‡ows. If these conditions are
satis…ed the IMF …nds it optimal to ‘promise’ to engage in sub-optimal ex-post crisis resolution,
characterised by ‘excessive’ PSI. If the Fund is unable to commit to this ex-post sub-optimal
PSI policy, we have that ex-ante capital in‡ows may be too high (i.e. there is investor moral
hazard), and that investors earn positive rents as a result of IMF intervention.
5.4 Discussion
This section has discussed the role of PSI in both crisis prevention and resolution. It has shown
that, ex-post (i.e. after a crisis), the extent to which PSI takes place has an impact on the
conditionality contract, and on the IMF’s ‘returns’ from conditionality. In the presence of high
levels of external debt (k>k H), PSI is a pre-condition for e¤ective crisis resolution. At lower
levels of debt (k · kH), a PSI-tolerant IMF …nds it optimal to allow for some PSI as part of its
conditionality, in order to enhance the e¤ectiveness of crisis resolution.
Ex-ante (i.e. before a crisis), expected PSI a¤ects the in‡ow of foreign capital and, in the
presence of investor moral hazard considerations, the probability of a crisis taking place.
Given this role of PSI, we have identi…ed some key drivers which can be expected to a¤ect the
level of PSI included in the Fund’s overall conditionality package following a crisis. These include
the attitude of the Fund to PSI (i.e. aversion vs. tolerance), its ability to credibly commit before
a crisis to an ex-post sub-optimal level of PSI, the investors’ outside option (which is a function
of their ability to act collectively following a crisis) and, …nally, the seriousness of the concern
65The restriction on ¹ ° stated in Footnote 58 is satis…ed for all the parameter values plotted in Figure 13.
40for investor moral hazard. We have shown that a relief-tolerant IMF with access to commitment
technology has incentives to commit to maximise PSI ex-ante, if investor moral hazard is strong
and if investors are relatively weak (in the sense that they are unable to co-ordinate on an
e ¢ c i e n tr e s o l u t i o no ft h ec r i s i s ) .I fo n eo ft h e s et w oc o n d i t i o n sd o e sn o th o l d( o ri ft h eI M Fi s
not credible in its promises), PSI will be at its ex-post optimum. If the reason why maximum
PSI is not attainable is either lack of commitment power on the part of the Fund or the ability
of investors to co-ordinate following a crisis, then investor moral hazard may not be mitigated
in equilibrium.
The discussion of PSI presented in this section also raises distributional and e¢ciency con-
siderations with regard to the Fund’s post-crisis intervention. Ex-post (i.e. following a crisis)
debtor countries are indi¤erent to the Fund’s choice of conditionality contract (including its PSI
component) if the IMF can commit to make their IRC bind (as in our baseline model). If the
IMF’s commitment power is limited, as in our debtor moral hazard extension, the debtor country
may able to bene…t from any rents extracted by the Fund as a result of its PSI policy (i.e. the
¯ parameter introduced in Section 4 may be a function of Ã). If this is the case, the Fund may
be facing a trade-o¤ between the mitigation of investor and debtor moral hazard respectively.
Investors on the other hand are never indi¤erent to the Fund’s choice of Ã, and their welfare is
maximised by a PSI-averse IMF (i.e. one which sets Ãc = ¡¸). Any choice of PSI above this level
implies a utility transfer from the investors to the IMF. If the IMF’s and the investors’ utility
is weighed equally from the point of view of global welfare, this enhances overall e¢ciency.66
Finally, from the point of view of ex-ante e¢ciency, the ex-post optimal PSI policy followed
by a PSI-tolerant Fund may be sub-optimal. If debtors bene…t from the commitment technology
a¤orded by IMF conditionality in terms of a reduction in ine¢cient credit-rationing (see Section
3.2), a more lenient PSI policy might bene…t both debtors and investors in expected utility
terms, o¤setting the bene…ts to the Fund of higher PSI ex-post. If the IMF is concerned about
the issue of ex-ante credit-rationing (and if investor moral hazard is not too much of a concern)
the Fund may in fact …nd it optimal to set Ãc < 0 (or at least refrain from setting Ãc = ¹ Ã), thus
increasing the ex-ante utility of both debtors and investors.67
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has presented an agency framework to analyse IMF conditional lending. This model
can account for both a standard interpretation of IMF conditionality as a ‘safeguard’ of scarce
IMF resources (e.g. as applied until the debt crisis of the 1980s) and for a more contemporary ap-
proach to conditionality, which stresses the implications of conditionality on debtor-commitment,
debtor-moral hazard, and PSI. We have shown that “conditionality as a safeguard” of limited
IMF resources can be compatible with “conditionality as commitment technology”, and it can
relieve ine¢cient ex-ante credit rationing.
We have also described a context in which the IMF can induce both debtor and investor
66This is clear from the expression for the Fund’s marginal utility from PSI (see Figure 11). Lowering Ã below
0 has a marginal cost for the Fund of at least
kD
¸ , which is always greater than the investors’ marginal bene…t of




67For instance, if the IMF’s ex-ante utility includes a concern for credit rationing, e.g. V (Ã)=( 1¡ °(Ã))¹ U +
°(Ã)U ¡ (® ¡ k
¤(Ã)), then the condition for Ã
c = ^ Ã (C(PSI)) is harder to satisfy, given that it includes an extra
±k term on the right-hand side.
41moral hazard, because of its inability to pre-commit to extract all the rents from its e¢cient
crisis intervention. Debtor moral hazard can only be mitigated via ex-ante conditionality (or pre-
quali…cation). However, especially in the presence of strict IMF budget constraints (which may
be partially due to its inability to commit to limited ex-post bail-outs), moral-hazard reduction
may have to be traded-o¤ with less e¤ective safeguards on IMF loans. If the IMF is constrained
to lend under adequate safeguards, it may bias its intervention towards crisis resolution rather
than crisis prevention, leading to a sub-optimally high probability of crisis.
We have also shown that PSI is a central component of IMF’s rescue packages. PSI can be
an enabling condition for e¤ective crisis resolution, and it determines the IMF’s ‘returns’ from
intervening in a crisis. The optimal level of PSI if a crisis occurs may however lead to excessive
ex-ante capital in‡ows, generating an investor moral hazard problem. This implies that the Fund
may …nd it optimal to commit to a tougher stance of PSI ex-ante, to reduce capital in‡ows.
A general theme which has emerged throughout this paper is that are con‡icts between the
various functions which IMF conditionality can ful…ll. For instance, between the mitigation of
investor moral hazard and relaxation of ine¢cient ex-ante credit rationing; between debtor pro-
gram ownership (or the transfer of e¢cient ex-post commitment technology) and the presence of
debtor moral hazard; between ex-ante conditionality (crisis-prevention) and ex-post condition-
ality (lending under adequate safeguards); and, …nally, between e¢cient crisis resolution (from
the Fund’s perspective) and reducing the rents of foreign investors (which has implications for
investor moral hazard).
This variety of trade-o¤s shows that designing the optimal IMF conditionality contract is
a complex issue and that policy-makers need to be aware of the potential pitfalls of a partial-
equilibrium analysis when considering possible reforms of the International Financial Architec-
ture.
A Appendix
A.1 IMF Lending Practices68
Strictly speaking, the IMF does not lend money to its members. It instead allows members which
are experiencing external disequilibrium to purchase foreign exchange from the IMF’s usable
resources (made up of the quota contributions of members whose currency is su¢ciently strong)
using their own currency, which needs to be “re-purchased” within the timeframe imposed by
the Fund. To …nance these operations the IMF can draw on its quotas (which are currently at
about $300bn, following a 45% increase in 1999), and on Agreements to Borrow additional funds
w i t han u m b e ro fi t sm e m b e r s . 69
The rationale for the IMF’s lending practices originates with the desire of the architects of the
Bretton Woods system to establish an institution through which creditor countries could support
debtor countries in their adjustment e¤orts, and eliminate (or at least reduce) their temptation
to resort to measures which could compromise or damage international cooperation.70 The
68This section is partially based on IMF (2000a), IMF (2000b), IMF (2001) and Boughton (2000).
69The General Agreement to Borrow (of 1962) was resorted to in July 1998, to support an EFF to Russia, and
a New Agreement to Borrow was set up with 23 lending countries in 1998, and used later that year to help …nance
a Standy-By to Brazil.
70Such as competitive depreciations and foreign trade restrictions, which had characterised the inter-war years
42practice of conditionality emerged soon after Bretton Woods, after an initial debate on whether
access to IMF funds should be “automatic” or “managed” (Friedman (1983)). Conditionality
was introduced in 1952, with the establishment of Stand-By Arrangements, to “balance the
safeguards for the Fund with assurance to the member of the availability of resources” (IMF
(2000b), p. 36).
The current conditionality practices (as set out in the 1979 Guidelines on Conditionality)
combine the phasing of lending and the use of quantitative performance criteria for “upper
tranche credit”, that is credit in excess of the …rst 25% of the member’s quota (which is instead
subject to very light conditionality). The standard vehicle of conditional lending is the Stand-By
Arrangement (SBA), which is intended to implement the IMF’s mandate by providing limited
(given the presence of access limits) and temporary assistance to countries experiencing cyclical
external disequilibrium. After the fall of Bretton Woods and the …rst oil shock, with current
account de…cits becoming more pronounced, the IMF introduced an additional lending facility
(the Extended Fund Facility (EFF)), which was intended to facilitate adjustment to more struc-
tural external disequilibrium, and is therefore longer (see Table 1). Both SBAs and EFFs are
subject to a basic rate, which is based on the interest on risk-free assets in industrial countries
(the SDR rate), plus a small surcharge.71
In the 1980s these two facilities were supplemented by the Structural Adjustment Facility
and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (subsequently renamed the Poverty Reduction
and Growth Facility (PRGF)) for concessional lending to low-income countries. More recently,
to deal with the larger and more rapid capital-account crises of the 1990s, the IMF introduced
the Supplementary Reserve Facility (SRF), which is larger than SBAs but subject to higher
(“penal”) charges, and a Contingent Credit Line (CCL), intended to deal with “contagion”-
induced capital out‡ows, and which is subject to “ex-ante conditionality” (or pre-quali…cation).
The SRF was …rst used to …nance the assistance package to Korea (in December 1997), which
was 20 times its quota, and has subsequently been used for Russia (1998), Brazil (1998), Turkey
(2000/2001), and Argentina (2000/2001). No IMF member has so far used the CCL. The features
of these IMF facilities are summarised in Table 1 below, which incorporates some of the recent
modi…cations introduced by the Fund following a review of its facilities undertaken in 2000.
Figure 14 plots the commitments made by the Fund since 1950, both in monetary terms (in
2000 US$) and in terms of number of programs. IMF lending picked up during the Suez Crisis,
and also following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, with large packages to Italy and
the UK in the late 1970s. The largest …nancial interventions by the IMF have however occurred
since the 1980s, following the debt crisis of 1982, the Mexico crisis of 1995, and the Asian and
Russian crises of 1997-98.
Overall 80% of the IMF’s “loans” since 1950 have been SBAs. Since the 1990s however 13%
of programs have been EFFs and 35% PRGFs.72 In terms of monetary commitments, the IMF
estimates that during the 1990s 40% of its lending has been for “capital-account crises”, 20% for
transition economies and the remaining 40% for more “traditional” current-account disequilibria
(IMF (2000b)). No industrial country has resorted to IMF lending since 1983.
after the collapse of the Gold Standard.
71For example, in January 2001 the SDR rate was at 4.4%, and the basic IMF rate at 5.1%.
72For the purpose of this classi…cation, used by the IMF in its annual report, SBAs and EFFs include SRFs.
43Table 1: IMF Lending Facilities
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* There is a surcharge for large loans (greater than 200% of quota).
**Currently set at 3%, rising to 5% for delayed repayment.
*** Currently set at 1.5%, rising to 3.5% for delayed repayment.
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Figure 14: IMF …nancial commitments since 1955
A.2 Omitted Proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. It is convenient to solve the IMF’s program by assuming at …rst that only the IRC binds
(which is always the case, since it is optimal for the IMF to minimise transfers b), and check
whether the “no transfers constraint” and the “adequate safeguards” constraint are satis…ed by
the solution of the simpler program.















44which delivers the …rst best level of conditionality ec
2 =1+¸. Plugging this back into
equation (9) and substituting for the appropriate value of U
R;¤
2 (depending on whether k is
above or below kD) yields the values for bc g i v e ni nP r o p o s i t i o n1 ( i ) .
Two conditions can therefore be identi…ed for when the bc · k constraint binds: k<min(¸
2,
kD) (which follows directly from the unconstrained solution for bc); and k ¸ max(kD;kM).T h i s
second condition derives from the unconstrained solution for bc for k>k D.T h i si sg r e a t e rt h a n
k for k>k M (as straightforward calculation reveals). Comparing kM and kD shows that kM
>k D i¤ kD > ¸
2. If the latter is not the case we therefore have that the bc · k constraint binds
for both k ¸ kD and k<k D, i.e. for all values of k:
The values for e2 given in Proposition 1(ii) are obtained from equation (9) by imposing b = k,
and substituting for the relevant value of U
R;¤
2 .F o rU
R;¤
2 = 1
2 ¡ (1 + ¸)k ( w h i c hi st h ec a s ef o r
k<k D), this yields the following quadratic in e2:
e2
2 ¡ 2e2 +1¡ 2¸k =0
where the optimal root is 1+
p








2 the IRC yields:
e2
2 ¡ 2e2 +1+2 k +(1¡ p)2 =0
which gives the following optimal root, e2 =1+
p
p(2 ¡ p) ¡ 2k =1+
p
2(kH ¡ k) which is
less than 1+¸ for k>max(kD;kM).F o rk>(1+¸)kD ´ kH the determinant of this expression
is negative, i.e. no conditionality can be imposed by the IMF.
Turning now to the “adequate safeguards” constraint, this never binds for p ¸ ¹ p = 2¸
1+¸,
which is given by making ASC binding for k = kH. For lower values of p, ASC will bind for k
high enough (but always above max(kD;kM), as straightforward comparison of the ASC with
the solution for fe2;bg obtained ignoring the ASC shows) and conditionality will collapse or be
weakened for k su¢ciently high.
To determine how conditionality needs to be adapted to satisfy the ASC consider the case
where all three constraints bind and ASC is tangent to IRC. This is the case for p =^ p<¹ p,
where ^ p is obtained by jointly satisfying e2 =1+ ¸
1+¸p ´ et
2 (ASC-IRC tangency condition),
e2 =1+
p
2(kH ¡ k) (given that b · k binds), and k =
p
1+¸e2 (from a binding ASC), and equals
the value given in Proposition 1.





such that for k>k ^ p conditionality collapses (i.e. it is not possible to meet all three constraints),
and for lower values of k the solution for conditionality is the same as the one obtained ignoring
the ASC, and given in case (ii) of the Proposition (see Figure 15).
For p<^ p, conditionality collapses “earlier”, i.e. for k>^ kH = kAS, where kAS is given









1+¸ <k b p). At k = kAS the
bail-out b is less than the capital out‡ow k (i.e. the b · k constraint is slack), which implies that
conditionality is lowered relative to the level implied by ignoring the ASC. This is so because
lowering k relative to k^ p and towards kAS implies that the IRC shifts downwards by more than
k in (b;e2) space, which in turn implies that at the tangency with ASC b<k .A sk takes values
which are lower than kAS the level of e2 under conditionality converges to the level obtained
ignoring the ASC (i.e. given in case (ii) of the Proposition).
45For p 2 (^ p; ¹ p] conditionality can be implemented also if k>k ^ p. In this case conditionality
collapses for k>^ kH = k3C,w h e r ek3C 2 (k^ p;kH] is given by the value of k for which all three
constraints bind. For k 2 (max(kD;kM);k3C] conditionality can be imposed, and its solution is



































Figure 15: Conditionality at p =^ p and k = k^ p.
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Part (i) follows from the maximisation of the IMF’s objective function, after substituting




¸ , and that therefore ec
1 = eFB
1 , as long as b · k does not
bind.
The value of bc is then obtained by replacing eFB














which simpli…es to the expression for bc g i v e ni nt h eP r o p o s i t i o n .
The value of kT is then obtained by equating the solution for bc with k. Di¤erentiation of
kT w.r.t. ¯ shows that @kT
@¯ < 0.
(ii) From part (i), k ¸ kT(¯) implies that the b · k constraint binds, and the conditional
e¤ort level is therefore lower than eFB
1 . In this case ec
1 is given by substituting k for b in
the IRC and solving for e1: This yields the following solution: ec
1 = eSB
1 (¯;k)=1+±ek + q£
2(¹ ° ¡ ±e) ¡ ±2
ek(2 + ¸(1 ¡ ¯))
¤
(1 ¡ ¯)¸k,w h i c he q u a l seFB
1 for k = kT(¯),a n dl i e sb e l o wi t
for higher values of k:
46Equating eSB
1 (¯;k) and ¹ e1 (¯;k) yields k =
¹ °¡±e
±2
e(1+¸(1¡¯)) ´ kU(¯); which is increasing in ¯.
This is the same value of k obtained by setting °(¹ e1 (¯;k)) to 0.
Imposing ¯ =0shows that kU(0) = kT(0): Given that kU(¯) is increasing in ¯ and kT(¯) is
decreasing in ¯, this implies kU(¯) ¸ kT(¯):
Finally, di¤erentiation of eSB
1 (¯;k) w.r.t. k shows that
@eSB
1 (¯;k)
@k ¸ 0 for k · kU(¯).T h i s
implies that if k<k U(¯),t h e n°(ec
1) > 0.
A.3 Micro-foundations
A.3.1 Derivation of the nature of adjustment e¤ort and of the liquidity cost ¸
This section of the Appendix outlines possible micro-foundations for the baseline model of con-
ditionality presented in Section 2. It describes a more structural model than the one presented
i nt h em a i nt e x t ,t oa c c o u n tf o rt h en a t u r eo fa d j u s t m e n te ¤ o r te and for the presence of a
liquidity cost of sudden capital out‡ows ¸k.73
Assume that the debtor country can produce two goods, exportables x and non-tradeables
n; and that it can direct resources from one sector to the other by changing the level of the
internal exchange rate between the two goods (i.e.
px
pn).74 The e¤ort variable employed in the
main text can be interpreted as representing this real exchange rate, i.e. e =
px
pn. The country’s
welfare is determined by the consumption of non-tradeables n and imports m. The latter can
b ep u r c h a s e dw i t he x p o r t sa n dw i t hf o r e i g nc a p i t a li n ‡ o w sk.
Given this general set-up, the policy-makers in the debtor country set the internal exchange
rate e to maximise welfare, and …nd it optimal to adjust its level to re‡ect the availability of
foreign exchange given by k. If internal prices are sticky in the short-run, a sudden scarcity of
foreign capital due to a balance of payments crisis will be associated with a liquidity ‘penalty’
¸.
To see this e¤ect explicitly it is useful to assume speci…c functional forms for the production
function of m and x, and for the country’s utility function. In particular we assume:
x = x(e)=e
and
n = n(x(e)) = 1 ¡
e2
4
These two functions imply a concave production possibility frontier between n and x,a n d
i l l u s t r a t eh o wt h ec h o i c eo fe ¤ o r te by the policy makers determines both the production of
exports and non-tradeables. We assume that exports can be exchanged one-for-one with imports
(i.e. the external exchange rate is 1), and that in‡ows of foreign capital, are used to buy imports.
That is, m = x + k.
The debtor country earns utility from the consumption of non-tradeables and imports ac-
cording to the following quasi-linear function, UR = m ¡ m2
4 + n, which implies, in terms of
e¤ort e:












73This set-up partially follows Fafchamps (1996), and is outlined in Foonote 16 in the main text.
74We omit time subscripts for notational simplicity.














The solution for e¤ shows that the greater the availability of foreign capital the lower is the
production of exportables, given the increased ability to purchase imports. This implies a lower
price of tradeables to non-tradeables, i.e. an appreciation of the real exchange rate .
Turning now to the situation described in the baseline model, consider an in‡ow of k at
t =1 , and the possibility that at t =2a crisis might take place. Assume now that the level of
e can only be changed at the end of each period t, and that at the end of t =1the debtor sets
e =1(which is optimal if the probability of ° is low enough).75 If a crisis then occurs, and e
is sticky in the short-run (i.e. it can only be changed at the end of t =2 ), the debtor needs to
pay k back to the investor without being able to change e to produce more tradeables (which
would be e¢cient given the higher marginal utility of imports associated with a negative capital
out‡ow).76
Comparing the utilities associated with the sticky-prices scenario (¹ e =1 ) and the ‡exible
price scenario (e¤ =1+k
2), both with an out‡ow of ¡k,w eo b t a i n :











This positive di¤erence in welfare levels measures the cost of a sudden withdrawal of foreign
capital, in the presence of sticky prices. Relating this result to the baseline model in the main
text, we therefore have that ¸k = k2
8 ,i . e .¸ = k
8. This shows that the liquidity cost associated
with a sudden crisis can be micro-founded, and that it is a function of k (which is intuitive, and
which is a feature we abstract from in the reduced-form model presented in the main text).
T h ep o l i c yc o n ‡ i c td e s c r i b e di nt h et e x tb e t w e e nt h eI M Fa n dt h ed e b t o rc a na l s ob ei n t r o -
duced in this extended set-up by assuming, for instance, that the IMF attaches less utility to
the debtor’s consumption of non-tradeables than the debtor himself (e.g. this could be because
the IMF wants to promote global trade, or because the debtor has political-economy reasons to
favour the non-tradeable sector), e.g.:













This yields, e¤;IMF = e¤
1¡!
2
>e ¤. The model in the main text reproduces this policy con‡ict
by assuming that the IMF want to maximise e, which is locally consistent with this.
75The optimal level of e will in fact be slightly above 1 to re‡ect “insurance” against the probability of crisis.
Allowing for this, as opposed to assuming e =1 , would not add particular insights to the analysis, but would
complicate the algebra signi…cantly.
76This is consistent with the possibility of debt-overhang setting in (which we allow for in the main text), if we
assume that the penalty in case of default is paid at the end of t =2 , when domestic prices can be varied.
48A.3.2 Derivation of unconditional transfer level ¯k in the debtor moral hazard
extension
The assumption that the IMF cannot commit not to transfer a level of unconditional funds ¯k
following a crisis can formalised by assuming the following IMF utility function:













2 . This revised utility function implies that, up to a point,
the IMF bene…ts from leaving some rents to the recipient when intervening (¢UR(e2;b) > 0),
and not making the recipient’s IRC binding.














+ ^ ¯ ¡ ¢UR
Setting @UIMF
@¢UR to zero we obtain the optimal level of rents ¢UR which the IMF wants to
leave to the recipient:
¢UR;c = ^ ¯ ¡
1
¸
which is positive (i.e. IRC is slack) as long as ^ ¯>1
¸.
Substituting for ¢UR and bc in the IMF’s objective function we …nally obtain ec
2 =1+¸
(assuming that the b · k constraint and ASC do not bind), as in the baseline case. This implies
that the optimal bail-out level is increased by
^ ¯¡ 1
¸
¸ relative to the binding IRC case, which
measures the level of unconditional IMF lending. That is, the level of ¯ assumed in the debtor
moral hazard extension in the main text can be computed as: ¯ =
^ ¯¡ 1
¸
¸k , which is a function of
both ¸ and k (in addition to the original altruism parameter ^ ¯).
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